The ModestOriginal Meaning of the Commerce Clause
Calvin H. Johnson*
The third power listed on the Constitution’s description of federal powers gives
Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, with Indian tribes and
among the states.1 Commentators now describe the commerce clause as “plenary”2 and
as “the single most important source of national power.”3 In the 1930’s, the Supreme
Court turned from a narrow, restricting interpretation of “commerce” to a loose and
permissive interpretation, and in that debate, and its current reiterations, the commerce
clause has been treated as the broadest general power of the federal government and the
frontier most likely to mark the outer boundaries of federal jurisdiction.4 The commerce
clause is also now described as a “strong impetus for calling the Constitutional
Convention.” 5 Contemporaries listed regulation of commerce as one of the
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Constitution’s major purposes. Washington’s cover letter transmitting the Convention’s
draft of the Constitution to the old Congress listed five new powers, saying that the desire
is that that national government would have the power “to make war, peace, and treaties,
levy money and to regulate commerce.”6 Anti-Federalist Richard Henry Lee listed tax to
pay the war debts and the commerce power as the purposes of the Constitution.7 If the
commerce clause was even a contributory cause of the constitutional revolution, it is
important.
This review of the constitutional debates, however, strongly indicates that the
power to “regulate commerce” does not have much weight to explain why the
Constitution was adopted. This review reinforces the conclusion, reached by a quite old
but superb article, that the commerce clause was originally “a modest little power.” 8
The Commerce Clause has grown to be important only by evolution and the passage of
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for the just purposes of paying debts, or for supporting the federal government; and that they
cannot make treaties of commerce, unless power unlimited, of regulating trade be given.
See also Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 18, 1786), in 8 MADISON PAPERS 500, 501
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time. If we are to be bound by the original meaning of the commerce clause in strict
historical context, there is nothing within the power to regulate commerce that has any
importance.
“Regulation of commerce” was most importantly a cover of words for the
program of nationalizing the state “imposts” or taxes on imports. Under the mercantilist
economics then dominant, any restriction on imports would preserve precious specie and
serve the national welfare. Revenue was also critical to the Founders to restore the public
credit. But revenue was adequately described as a tax measure, authorized by other
provisions, so that commerce clause was not needed for tax issues.
“Regulation of commerce” was also used as a reference for three restrictive
mercantilist programs that never had enough political strength behind them to be
seriously considered: (1) an American Navigation Act, giving Northern shippers a
monopoly on the export of Southern commodities, (2) a retributional impost against the
British to induce them to open up the West Indies ports to American ships and (3) port
preferences requiring that all dealings with foreigners be conducted through preferred
ports. None of the three ever amounted to anything and indeed port preferences were
banned by the Philadelphia Convention itself. Notwithstanding the word cover used,
programs without genuine political support can not be used to explain the Constitutional
revolution.
Finally, this review shows that interstate commerce was not at issue in the
debates. The Founders cared a lot about fairness between the states, but their concerns
were focused almost entirely in various provisions outside the commerce clause.
Interstate tolls and discriminatory regulations were already banned by the articles of
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confederation and interstate tolls were not a realistic threat. The Constitution was not
needed to ban them.
“Regulation of commerce” was given to the national government to accomplish
specific programs the Framers desired. To determine the meaning of the words in strict
historical context, one must strip away the cover of words and look at the programs
underneath. Words do have a penumbra beyond the programs that they were trying to
accomplish, but the words of any historical document are always actions attempting to
find allies to accomplish a program, and to understand even the penumbra of words one
must first understand the core programs.9 “Regulation of Commerce” is a vague,
umbrella phrase that might cover a very wide range of grievances, but it is possible from
the sample to decipher “regulation of commerce” into the specific programs that the
advocates of the Constitution wanted.
To determine what was meant by “regulation of commerce,” this article collects
and categorizes 157 uses of the phrase “regulation of commerce” or the word
“commerce” in the debates over the Constitution. One hundred thirty-six of those uses
are associated with a specific goal or program and it is those 136 uses that forms the
100% used as a baseline to measure the relative weight of the programs, as percentage of
sampled quotes. The samples come from both sides of the debate and the sampling was
intended to be omnivorous.10 Usually the meaning of “regulation of commerce” comes
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as an unintended by-product of the speaker’s vigorous argument and usually the speakers
do not seem to be manipulating the meaning of “regulation of commerce” to stretch or
contract the definition of “commerce.” One must generally be suspicious that speeches in
the ratification are insincere. The proponents of the Constitution understated the meaning
of the Constitution to get it passed and the opponents exaggerated its impact to get it
defeated. Still, when the debaters were spinning out some other argument, the definition
of “commerce” they assumed is more reliable.11 It is the main argument and not the
assumed side definition of regulation of commerce that the speaker is spinning.
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwfr.html, JAMES MADISON, ALEXANDER HAMILTON & JOHN JAY,
THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/federal/fed.htm, and JONATHAN ELLIOT,
THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION,
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Navigation Acts, to prevent Congress from giving shippers a monopoly that might allow them to set their
price for Southern crops and reduce their value by “perhaps 50 Per Ct” (2 FARRAND’S RECORDS 631), and a
Navigation Act that Mason opposed was a monopoly on shipping. If Mason was right on September 14
that regulation of commerce did not include navigation act monopolies, he would not have needed the twothirds restriction on the Navigation Act that he proposed on September 15. Mason would later come to
conclude that even as construed by the proponents of the Constitution, Congress could “grant monopolies
in trade and commerce.” George Mason, Objections to the Proposed Constitution, in 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES
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The sampling did not pick up dictionary definitions.12 Dictionaries are, at best, a
sampling of usages from some time or place. There is very considerable danger in using
dictionary definitions to smuggle quotes out of context and from unrelated controversies
into the Constitutional text. A dictionary definition seems like the best way to infect the
archeological site with artifacts from another place and time. All of the samples here are
from debates related broadly to the formulation or adoption of the Constitution. On
another day, the samples might have been organized with different categories and some
quotes might have been put into different bins, but the quibbles at the margin do not
materially lower the validity of the conclusions.
The table immediately following summarizes the results of the sampling.
“Commerce” in the constitutional debates referred primarily, at 82% of the programassociated quotes, to Atlantic Ocean shipping. The most important issues within
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“regulation of commerce” were tax issues: “to regulate commerce” meant “to tax it”
(26% of program-associated quotes), and tax was adequately covered by clauses outside
of the commerce clause. The remainder of the actively-proposed programs under
“regulation of commerce,” besides tax, were restrictions on foreign trade, consistent with
the then-dominant economic philosophy of mercantilism. Proponents of the Constitution
advocated retributional tariffs against the British to punish the British for excluding
American ships from the British West Indies (28%) and they advocated giving American
ships a monopoly on the export of American commodities (22%). None of the mercantile
restrictions amounted to much, however, even after the Constitution was ratified.
“Commerce” was also used as a justification for restrictions on the states to protect outof-state citizens (17%), but the remedies are mostly specified outside of the commerce
clause. The language of the commerce clause also covers trade with the Indians and
commerce among the states, but there were no active debates or proposals that show up in
the 157 samples under either trade with the Indians or among the states.
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Sample of 157 cites for “Commerce” categorized

1. Deep water shipping
a. Regulation of commerce means taxation
b. Retribution to open foreign ports
c. Restrictions on U.S. ports.
d. Other foreign shipping
2. U.S. Border Land Issues
3. Equity between States
a. Interstate Commerce
b. Fairness of one state to another reflected
in other clauses.
Sum of reference to programs
4. Words without Controversies
a. Commerce apart from manufacture and
agriculture
c. Too vague to categorize

112
35
38
30
9
1

1
23

Percent of references to
programs (136 total)
82%
26%
28%
22%
1%
17%

13
10

10%

136

100%
21

15
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A. Deep Water Shipping
For 82% of the cites, “regulation of commerce” relates to Atlantic Ocean
shipping. Gordon Wood has argued that “commerce” usually referred to international
trade in the eighteenth century13 and the sample confirms that description. The four most
important programs mentioned in the Constitutional debates related to international trade:
(1) nationalization of the state imposts, (2) retaliation against the British for restrictions
on West Indies shipping; (3) port preferences, and (4) an American Navigation Act. All
were all deep-water shipping issues and within the then-dominant economic philosophy
of mercantilism.
1. The Impost
13
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“commerce” and did not begin to refer domestic trades until the nineteenth century, which is beyond the
borders of the time period sampled here.
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The most important “commerce” issue in the ratification debate was the state
imposts. The core grievance was the 2-1/2% impost that New York State imposed on
imports coming in through New York harbor.14 For thirty-two cites, regulation of
commerce means federalizing the state imposts, chiefly New York’s, so as to allow the
federal government to get the revenue from tax on foreign imports.15 Closely related is
14

See, e.g., 1784 N.Y. Laws 12 (Nov. 18, 1784): The 2-1/2% rate was the default rate; for listed goods,

e.g., Madeira wine, a specific amount was set per case in shillings or pence.
15

(1) David Ramsey (So. Carolina), Speech to the Continental Congress (Jan. 27, 1783) in 25 JCC 869

(saying that states could not pay the revolutionary debts because “rivalships relative to trade wd. impede a
regular impost”); (2) James Madison, Address to the States, by the United States in Congress Assembled
(Apr. 26, 1783), in 24 JCC 277, 278 (advocating state ratification of 5% federal impost to pay the debts of
the Revolutionary War because impost can not be used without concerted uniformity, properly achieved
through Congress, because of the position of more commercial states); (3) Report of a Committee of
Spraight, Monroe, et. al. to Continental Congress, (March 3, 1786), reprinted in 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 111
(reporting proposal to allow Congress to lay such imposts and duties on imports and exports as may be
necessary to regulate the trade of the states with foreign nations and with each other); (4) “Z,” Philadelphia
Freeman’s J., May 16, 1787, 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 99 (“It has been seen that the States individually
cannot, with any success pretend to regulate trade. The duties and restrictions which one State imposes, the
neighbouring States enable the merchant to evade.”); (5) Edmund Randolph, Speech to the Federal
Convention (May 29, 1787) 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS 19 (Madison notes) (saying that that there were many
advantages, which the U.S. could not attain under the confederation “such as a productive impost-counteraction of the commercial regulations of other nations -- pushing of commerce ad libitum-- &c
“&c.”); (6) Roger Sherman, Speech before the Federal Convention (June 6, 1787), in 1F ARRAND’S
RECORDS 143 (referring to “powers to regulate comerce & draw therefrom a revenue”); (7) Nathaniel
Gorham, Speech before the Federal Convention (July 23, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS 90 (saying that
New York is much attached to her present advantage “of taxing her neighbours by the regulation of her
trade”); (8) Edmund Randolph, Draft of the Constitution for Committeee on Detail, July 1787, 2
FARRAND’S RECORDS 142 (categorizing “regulation of commerce both foreign and domestic” as fifth
subdivision under congressional power to tax); (9) James Wilson, Speech at the Federal Convention (Aug.
16, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS 306 (dwelling on the injustice of leaving “N. Jersey Connecticut &c
any longer subject to the exactions of their commercial neighbours”) (emphasis added) ; (10) John Mercer
(Maryland), Speech at the Federal Convention (Aug. 16, 1787) in 2F ARRAND’S RECORDS 307 (opposing
giving Congress power to tax exports because the States now a right to tax both imports and exports of their
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uncommercial neighbours and [i]t was enough for them to sacrifice one half of it”) (emphasis added); (11)
Roger Sherman, Speech at the Federal Convention (Aug. 16, 1787) in 2F ARRAND’S RECORDS 308 (saying
that “[t]he oppression of the uncommercial States was guarded agst. by [Congress’s] power to regulate
trade between the States”); (12) Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 10
MADISON PAPERS 205, 211 (saying that there was no definable distinction between the power of regulating
trade and that of drawing revenue from it.); (13) THE FEDERALIST NO. 7, at 40 (Nov. 7, 1787) (Alexander
Hamilton) (citing as a need for the Constitution, the opportunities which some states including New York
“have of rendering others tributary to them, by commercial regulations”); (14) HUGH WILLIAMSON, SPEECH
AT EDENTON,

NORTH CAROLINA (NOV. 8, 1787) reprinted in 2 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 231 (saying

that by imposts and other regulations of commerce, it will be in the power of government to collect a vast
revenue for the general benefit of the nation); (15) THE FEDERALIST NO. 12, at 72 (Nov. 17, 1787)
(Alexander Hamilton) (saying that a general union will be conducive to the interests of commerce and
extend the revenue to be drawn from it); (16) James Wilson, Speech to the Pennsylvania Ratification
Convention, Nov. 24, 1787, in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS 141 (“Devoid of power, we could neither prevent
the excessive importations which lately deluged the country, nor even raise from that excess a contribution
to the public revenue”); (17) THE FEDERALIST NO.12, at 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Nov. 27, 1787) (saying
that the “single article of ardent spirits, under federal regulation, might be made to furnish a considerable
revenue”) (emphasis added); (18) Landowner IX, Connecticut Courant, Dec. 31, 1787 reprinted in 15
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 192 (saying that New York impost draws 40,000 pounds from Connecticut and
ruins our foreign trade); (19) Charles Pinckney, South Carolina House of Representatives (Jan. 16, 1788),
in 4 Elliot’s Debates 253-54 (saying that loss of credit and inability in our citizens to pay taxes were the
result of the “destruction of our commerce, caused by other nations’ restrictions that the general
government could not counteract”); (20) Rawlins Lowndes, Debate in the South Carolina Legislature (Jan.
16, 1788), in 2D EBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 22 (saying that Congress by the 1783 Impost proposal asked
for the power to regulate commerce for only a limited time and opposing the Constitution because it gave
Congress the power to regulate commerce ad infinitum); (21) THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, at 262 (Jan. 18,
1788) (James Madison) (asking “was it not an acknowledged object … that the regulation of trade should
be submitted to the general government in such a form as would render it an immediate source of general
revenue?); (22) Thomas Dawes, Massachusetts Ratification Convention (Jan. 21, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT’S
DEBATES 58 (saying that state imposts drive the trade to neighboring states making the states rely on taxes
on land to satisfy requisitions, and objecting to different systems of duties in different states); (23) THE
FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 283 (Jan. 22, 1788) (James Madison) (saying that the object of the power of
regulating commerce was the “…relief of the States which import and export through other States, from the
improper contributions levied on them by the latter.”); (24) THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 301 (Jan. 25,
1788) (James Madison) (saying that the prohibition of state taxes on imports and exports is proven by the
necessity of “submitting regulation of trade to foederal councils”); (25) Charles Pinckney, Speech in the
House of Representatives, 2 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, 16th Cong., 1st Sess. 1318 (Feb. 14, 1820) (arguing that
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the prohibition the Constitution adopted on states laying taxes on exports, again to
prevent the “commercial states” with deep-water harbors from abusing their
uncommercial neighbors by taxing shipments of goods produced by their neighbors for
export (3 cites).16

Congress could not prohibit movement of slaves to territories because power over inter-state commerce by
water between the states was given to prevent port preferences and the obligations of paying duties on
commerce to another state); (26) “A Farmer,” Philadelphia Freeman’s J., April 23, 1788 reprinted in 17
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 139 (saying that power of regulating commerce ought to belong to the general
government and that the burden of debt incurred by the revolution has rendered a general revenue
necessary, so that imposts upon importations present themselves, not only as a source of revenue, but as
revenue for which the governments of the particular states are incompetent); (27) “A Plebian,” An Address
to the People of New York, April 17, 1788, reprinted in 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 160 (not objecting to
granting the general government power to regulate trade and lay imposts for that purpose, as well as raising
revenue, but saying that the hopes from the change will never realized because the country buys more than
it sells and because there are too many merchants); (28) “To Be or Not to Be? Is the Question, New
Hampshire Gazette, April 18, 1788, in 2 DEBATES ON THE CONSTITUTION 404 (Bernard Bailyn, ed., 1992)
(“an increased revenue from a proper and universal regulation of trade will render needless so large a dry
tax as we have been subject to); (29) Letter from James Madison to J.C. Cabell (Sept. 18, 1828), reprinted
in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS 477 (encouragement of manufacturing was an object of the power to regulate
trade, as indicated that Framers and Ant-Federalists in the first Congress had proposed duties and even
prohibitions of articles that competed with domestic production); (30) Letter from James Madison to
Joseph C. Cabell (Feb. 18, 1828), reprinted in @@ FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION @@ (saying that power to
lay imposts is included in the power to regulate trade, even though tax is expressed separately); (31) Letter
from James Madison to Joseph C. Cabell (Sept. 18, 1828), reprinted in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS 477 (saying
that federal power over interstate commerce “grew out of the abuse of the power by the importing States in
taxing the non-importing”); (32) Madison, Preface To Debates in the Convention of 1787 (c. 1830), in 3
FARRAND’S RECORDS 547 (saying that want of a general congressional power over commerce led to an
exercise of this power separately by the States, engendered undercutting rivalry and “vain attempts to
supply their respective treasuries by imposts”).
16

(1) James Wilson, Debate in the Federal Convention (Aug. 21, 1781), in 1E LLIOT’S DEBATES 455

(saying that to deny the federal government the power to tax exports is “is to take from the common
government half the regulation of trade”); (2) Roger Sherman, Speech at the Federal Convention (Aug. 16,
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New York had vetoed the 1783 proposal to give the general government the
revenue from an impost. New York’s motivation was to retain the revenue from the
New York harbor impost for exclusive New York needs.17 Under the Articles of
Confederation, one state could veto any amendment and so New York’s vote was
sufficient to defeat the federal impost.18 Madison later wrote that New York refused the
5% impost “for the urgent debt of the Revolution,” just so as “to tax the consumption of
her neighbours.”19 When New York vetoed the 1783 impost, it is bears repeating, every
"liberal good man [wished] New York in Hell."20
New York was expected to repeat its veto of nationalization of the impost if again
given the chance under the unanimity requirements of the Articles of Confederation.
New York was too much attached to “taxing her neighbours by the regulation of her

1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS 308 (supporting prohibition of tax on exports, but saying that the
“oppression of the uncommercial States [by commercial states] was guarded agst. by the power to regulate
trade between the States”); (3) Gouverneur Morris, Speech in the Federal Convention (Aug. 21,1787), in 2
FARRAND’S RECORDS 360 (arguing that without prohibition, “exporting States will tax the produce of their
uncommercial neighbours.”).
17

JOHN P. KAMINSKI, GEORGE CLINTON YEOMAN POLITICIAN OF THE NEW REPUBLIC 89-96 (1993). New

York, in form, merely set new conditions on approval, including a New York state officer being appointed
to collect the revenue and New York paper money being accepted for the tax, but the conditions were
understood on both sides to be tantamount to veto. New York paper would not help pay Dutch or French or
Pennsylvania creditors.
18

Articles of Confederation, art. XIII, 19 JCC 221.

19

James Madison, Unsent letter to John Tyler (1833), in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS 530-531.

20

Letter from Henry Jackson to Henry Knox (Apr. 23, 1786), quoted in Robert A. Freer, Shay’s Rebellion

and the Constitution: A Study in Causation, 42 NEW ENG. Q. 388, 398 (1969).
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trade.”21 “Much opposition is expected in New York,” Timothy Pickering wrote home.22
“That state has long been acting a disingenuous part. They refused the impost to
Congress–because half of New Jersey, a great part of Connecticut, the western part of
Massachusetts and Vermont, received their imported goods through New York, who put
into her own tresury all the duties arising on the goods consumed in [these] states.”23
New York exclusive use of the revenue from shipping through New York harbor
was not a program with any attraction out of state. Connecticut and New Jersey were
outraged by the New York impost.24 In Connecticut, the proponents of the Constitution
warned that those “gentlemen in New York who receive large salaries … know that their
offices will be more insecure … when the expenses of government shall be paid by their

21

Mr. Nathaniel Gorham, Speech at the Federal Convention (July 23, 1787), in 2F ARRAND’S RECORDS 90.

22

Letter from Timothy Pickering to John Pickering (Dec. 29, 1787), in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 177.

23

Id.

24

See, e.g., Oliver Ellsworth, Connecticut Ratifying Convention (Jan. 7, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES

190-197 (saying that the people of Connecticut, pay annually into the treasury of New York more than fifty
thousand dollars by reason of the impost on New York harbor traffic); EDITORIAL, NEW ENGLAND
CONNECTICUT COURANT (Dec. 24, 1787), reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 80, 82 (saying that
“those gentlemen in New York who receive large salaries … know that their offices will be more insecure
… when the expenses of government shall be paid by their constituents, than while paid by us.”) In 1786
New Jersey announced she would contribute no more by way of requisitions given that the taxes she had
paid to New York by way of the New York impost were enough. VOTES AND PROCEEDING OF THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY 12, Sess. 10, 2d sitting (1786). FORREST MCDONALD,
WE THE PEOPLE: THE ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 126,141 (1958) attributes the quick and
overwhelming ratification of the Constitution by Connecticut and New Jersey to the New York harbor
impost controversy.
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constituents, than while paid by us.”25 The New York impost undermined requisitions as
well. New Jersey repudiated the 1786 requisition based on the argument that New Jersey
had paid enough tax already because it received its imports through New York and
Philadelphia.26 New Jersey, placed between Philadelphia and New York, was “a Cask
tapped at both ends.”27 New Jersey and Connecticut ratified the Constitution quickly and
overwhelmingly to nationalize the New York harbor taxes.28
Rogue Island shared New York’s villainy. Rhode Island had vetoed a similar
proposal in 1781 to give Congress a 5% impost.29 “Rhode Island, as a weak State,”
Madison told Congress in 1783, “[is against the] General revenue as tending … to
deprive her of the advantage afforded by her situation of taxing the commerce of the

25

EDITORIAL, NEW ENGLAND CONNECTICUT COURANT (Dec. 24, 1787), reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY

HISTORY 80, 82.
26

VOTES AND PROCEEDING OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY 12, Sess. 10, 2d

sitting (1786). See RUTH BOGIN, ABRAHAM CLARK AND THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY IN THE
REVOLUTIONARY ERA, 1774-1794, at 127-131 (1982).
27

James Madison, Preface to Debates in the Convention of 1787 (c. 1830), in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS 539,

542.
28

MCDONALD, supra note 24, at 126,141. Accord, see James Madison, Notes to Speech to the Continental

Congress (Feb. 26, 1783), in 25 JCC 913 (saying that both Connecticut and New Jersey favored general
revenue to protect their commerce against New York tax.)
29

Letter from the Rhode Island Speaker of the Assembly, (Nov. 30, 1782), in 23 JCC 788-789 (Dec. 12,

1782) (announcing that Rhode Island refused the 1781 impost because the impost would be hardest on
commercial states, would introduce foreign collectors into Rhode Island and would give Congress funding
independent of its constituents).
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contiguous States.”30 When Rhode Island vetoed the impost, Rhode Island thereafter
became the “evil genius” whose veto “injured the United States more than the worth of
that whole state.”31 Rhode Island was “shameful” and this “perverse sister,”32 this
“Cursed State, [which] ought to be erased out of Confederation, and … out of the earth, if
any worse place could be found for them.”33
The Founders also generalized their condemnation beyond New York and Rhode
Island. In North Carolina, Hugh Williamson called for ratification of the Constitution to
end the Virginia and South Carolina taxes on goods imported into North Carolina.34
“Publius” said that the object of the Constitution’s giving Congress the power to regulate
commerce was relief for the “[s]tates which import and export through other States from

30

James Madison, Notes to a Speech to the Continental Congress (Feb. 26, 1783), in 25 JCC 913. Accord,

Alexander Hamilton, Speech to the Continental Congress (Feb. 13, 1783) (James Madison, Notes of
Debates in the Continental Congress), in 25 JCC 902 (saying that “the true objection on the part of R. I.
was the interference of the impost with the opportunity afforded by their situation of levying contributions
on Cont., &c, which recd. foreign supplies through the ports of R. I.”).
31

State Gazette of South-Carolina (Charleston), June 1, 1786 and “A Fable,” Exchange Adviser (Boston),

February 11, 1786 both quoted in IRVIN H. POLISHOOK, RHODE ISLAND AND THE UNION, 1774-1795, at 96
(1969).
32

James Madison to Edmund Randolph, November 19, 1783, 5 MADISON PAPERS 289.

33

John Montgomery to Edward Hand, July 26, 1784, 6 LETTERS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE CONTINENTAL

CONGRESS 575 (Edmund C. Burnett, ed. 1921-1936).
34

HUGH WILLIAMSON, REMARKS ON THE NEW PLAN OF GOVERNMENT TO THE FREEMEN OF EDENTON,

NORTH CAROLINA, DAILY ADVERTISER, NEW YORK (Feb. 25-27, 1788), reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 201, 207.
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the improper contributions levied on them by the latter.”35 Publius also said that under
the Articles some states have the opportunity of rendering others “tributary” to them by
laying duties on her importations.36 Hamilton, in his own exposed public role, argued
that “uncommercial” states would never be able to bear the quota assigned under the
ordinary rules of apportioning requisitions because they had borne imposts as well.37 The
uncommercial states would fail in paying their quota, Hamilton argued, their example
would be followed, and the Union would then inevitably dissolve.38 For the Federalists,
the state imposts levied by states with good harbors was a prime example of an immoral
state willing to abuse its neighbors.
Revenue from foreign imports also required a uniform policy along the whole
coast. If one state tried to raise rates, a neighboring state would destroy the revenue by
undercutting the tax rates to channel commerce in her direction. The general
government would regulate commerce with a uniform impost and so make commerce
productive of general revenue.39
35

THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 283 (James Madison)(first published January 22, 1788) (emphasis added).

36

THE FEDERALIST NO. 7, at 40 (Alexander Hamilton)(first published Nov. 17, 1787).

37

Alexander Hamilton, Speech to the Federal Convention (June 18, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS 286

(Madison’s Notes).
38

Id.

39

See, e.g., Thomas Dawes, Massachusetts Ratification Convention (Jan. 21, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT’S

DEBATES 58 (saying that state imposts drive the trade to neighboring states); “Z,” Philadelphia Freeman’s
J., May 16, 1787, 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 99 (“It has been seen that the States individually cannot,
with any success pretend to regulate trade. The duties and restrictions which one State imposes, the
neighbouring States enable the merchant to evade.”); Madison, Preface To Debates in the Convention of
1787 (c. 1830), in 3F ARRAND’S RECORDS 547 (saying that want of a general congressional power over
commerce led to an exercise of this power separately by the States, engendered undercutting rivalry and
“vain attempts to supply their respective treasuries by imposts”).
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The revenue aspects of the imposts was very important to the adoption of the
Constitution, but the equity aspects of fight over the New York impost is probably
properly viewed, as Merrill Jensen put it, as a “tempest in a teapot.”40 The New York tax
at 2-1/2% was probably not even worth smuggling around. The New York deep-water
harbor and established docks were probably worth many times that 2-1/2% amount. It
was hard to unload a deep water ship without a deep water harbor.41
From 1784 through 1787 New York exempted from its impost goods held for reexport, provided they were kept in their original package.42 To the extent that New York
was acting as a wholesaler or middleman, breaking up and distributing imported goods
for the Vermont, New Jersey and Connecticut countryside, the “original package”
requirement would have prevented the exemption from applying. The exemption was

40

MERRILL JENSEN, THE NEW NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE CONFEDERATION,

1781-1789, at 339 (1950); J. ALBERT GIESECKE, AMERICAN COMMERCIAL LEGISLATION BEFORE 1789, at
135 (1910). Merrill Jensen is a historian with not much sympathy for the Federalist proponents of the
Constitution, and his characterization can be understood as a jab at the Framers, but no jab at the framers is
intended here in agreeing with Jensen’s conclusion as to the importance of the New York impost.
41

James Madison, Letter to James Monroe (June 21, 1785), in 8 MADISON PAPERS 306, 307 complains

that prices on Baltimore and Philadelphia docks for Virginia exports were 15-20% higher than on Virginia
rivers. If we attribute that entirely to the advantage of good deep water docks versus shallow river docks,
then the value of deep water facilities would be six to eight times what New York was charging in tax for
their use.
42

Laws of New York, 8th Sess., 2d Meeting, at 12 (Nov. 18, 1784); Laws of New York, 10th Sess., at 513

(Apr. 11, 1787). South Carolina, Massachusetts and Virginia had similar exemptions for re-exports kept in
the original package. Edward Kitch, Regulation and the American Common Market, in REGULATION,
FEDERALISM AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE 9, 17-19 (A. Dan Tarlock, ed. 1981).
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narrowed dramatically, however, in April 1787 to apply only if the goods were not landed
in New York. The captain of the ship had to take an oath that the exempted goods were
not intended to be landed or put on shore in New York nor brought back into New York.
After April 1787, importers could not use the New York harbor wharves to ship through
New York in the original package without paying the 2-1/2% tax.43 In any event, the
considerable non-tax advantages of using New York harbor and docks to land cargo and
break up the package probably meant the exemption was not much used. New York’s
neighbors complained about the 2-1/2% tax, but they got enough value out of the harbor
and docks to pay it.
Federalizing the imposts was the feature of the commerce clause which generated
almost universal assent, outside of New York and Rhode Island.44 Revenue could be
collected from imports at all only if the states did not undercut each other. Only the
“foederal head with full authority [could prevent] State Schemes … pursued with
Surreptitious views against each other, which must eventually destroy a source of
Revenue that might be immensely valuable to the Union.”45 Hamilton argued that
imposts by the individual states would be difficult to enforce, because the bays, rivers and
long borders between the states made smuggling too easy. On the federal level, however,
there was only one side to guard–the Atlantic.46 The “impost” was the least objectionable
federal tax because it could be collected without interfering with the “internal police” of
43

Laws of New York, 10th Sess., at 513 (Apr. 11, 1787). In the 1784 version, a shipper had 60 days to re-

export goods after a landing. Laws of New York, 8th Sess., 2d Meeting, at 14 (Nov. 18, 1784).
44

Abel, supra note 8, at 451, 446-451.

45

Letter from Edmund Carrington to Gov. Edmund Randolph (April 2, 1787) in 9 MADISON PAPERS 362.

46

THE FEDERALIST NO. 12, at 77 (Alexander Hamilton)(first published Nov. 27, 1787).
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the states.47 It had been approved by the overwhelming majority of the states in 1781 and
1783 defeated by selfish New York in 1783 and “obdurate” Rhode Island in 1781.48 The
Anti-Federalists, while opposing the power of Congress to lay general internal or dryland taxes except by requisition upon the states, nonetheless generally conceded that
Congress could be given the power to lay “external taxes” by the impost.49

47

Oliver Ellsworth, Debates in the Connecticut Convention on Ratification (Jan. 7. 1788), in 3

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 547, 549, 550.
48

After Rhode Island vetoed the 1781 Impost proposal, Virginia withdrew her prior ratification on the

ground that a federal tax was inconsistent with Virginia sovereignty. XI Statutes of Virginia 171 (William
Waller Hening, ed., Oct. 1782). Madison was appalled. See Letter from James Madison to Edmund
Randolph, January 22, 1783, 6 MADISON PAPERS 55-56 (saying that “Virginia could never have cut off this
source of public relief at a more unlucky crises”). New York and Rhode Island, however, bore the brunt of
the angry rhetoric.
49

FEDERAL FARMER, LETTERS TO THE REPUBLICAN, LETTER III, NEW YORK JOURNAL (Oct. 10, 1787),

reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 30, 35-36 (saying that impost may be collected by a few officers
in seaport towns, but opposing internal taxes); CATO UTICENIS, TO THE FREEMEN OF VIRGINIA, VIRGINIA
INDEPENDENT CHRONICLE (Oct. 17, 1787), reprinted in 8D OCUMENTARY HISTORY 70, 73 (conceding
impost and allowing requisitions if imposts are not sufficient); AN OLD WHIG, LETTER VI, PHILADELPHIA
INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER (Nov. 24, 1787), reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 215, 218; BRUTUS V,
NEW YORK JOURNAL (Dec. 13, 1787), reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 422, 426-27; Letter from
James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Dec. 2, 1787), in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 332 (saying that the
power of taxing any thing but imports appears to be the most popular topic among the adversaries). Two
examples of Anti-Federalist opposition to a federal impost are James Wadsworth, Speech to the
Connecticut Convention (Jan. 7, 1788), in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 547 (arguing that impost is not a
proper mode of taxation) and John Smilie, Debates in the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Nov.
28,1788), in 2D OCUMENTARY HISTORY 407, 408-409 (saying “[i]f they have unlimited power to drain the
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The important aspect of the controversy over New York impost was that the
revenue was needed to pay off the Revolutionary war debts, and not just for New York
State needs. It was known that when the Constitution was ratified, Congress was going
to impose the 5% federal impost, denied to it by the one-state veto rule in 1781 and 1783.
“[W]as it not an acknowledged object of the Convention,” Madison asked, “and the
universal expectation of the people, that the regulation of trade should be submitted to the
general government in such a form as would render it an immediate source of general
revenue?”50
New York Governor George Clinton was said, as the ratification debate got
serious, to have offered New Jersey to give up the impost and refund collections if New
Jersey would just refuse to ratify the Constitution.51 New York’s giving revenue to New
Jersey, however, would not have improved the fiscal health of the federal government.
The rhetorical unfairness arguments seem to be just make-weights, almost a
sweetener to convince Connecticut and New Jersey to support the federal fiscal needs.
When the Constitution became final, Connecticut and New Jersey could expect a
wealth of the people, whether by imposts or by direct levies, then the system is too formidable for states to
break”)(emphasis added).
50

THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, at 262 (James Madison)(first published Jan. 18, 1788).

51

Deposition of Adam Boyd, Feb. 1789, BRUNSWICK GAZETTE (Feb. 10, 1789), DOCUMENTARY HISTORY:

MICROFICHE SUPPL. N.J. 170 (saying that Abraham Clark had thought New Jersey had ratified too
precipitously and that New York would have made concession including giving up the impost and
refunding prior collections if New Jersey would decline); PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL (Nov. 19, 1787), cited
in KAMINSKI, supra note 17, at 136 (reporting that Clinton was trying to defeat the Constitution by offering
a “person of considerable weight” (probably Abraham Clark) that New Jersey could have half of the New
York state impost if New Jersey would refuse to ratify.)
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doubling of the then current 2-1/2% impost on New York shipping up to the federal 5%
and there would be no possibility of exemption from the new doubled rate impost for
goods not landed or broken down in New York harbor.
The controversy over nationalizing the New York and other state imposts was
commonly called a “regulation of commerce” issue in the debates over the Constitution.
“Regulation of commerce” was often a synonym for taxation of commerce.52 In modern
usage, however, the impost is better called a revenue issue. Section 8 of Article 1 also
gives Congress the power to raise taxes on its own, including imposts, and section 10
prohibits state imposts. Thus the revenue issues were adequately covered elsewhere and
did not need the commerce clause.

2. Retaliation Against the British.
The largest number of the sampled cites to “regulation of commerce,” at thirtyeight cites and 28%, refer to attempts to open up foreign ports to U.S.–owned ships by
imposing or threatening a retaliatory impost or embargo on foreign ships coming into
American ports.53 The core grievance was that Great Britain, under the British
52

Of the sample of 32 quotes on regulation of commerce being a reference to the federalizing the impost in

supra note 15, nine of them use “regulation of commerce” to mean taxation.
53

(1) Report of a Committee of the Continental Congress of Gerry, Reed, Williamson, Chase and

Jefferson (Apr. 30, 1784), in 26 JCC 313 (proposing that the legislatures of the States give Congress the
power for 15 years to prohibit imports in a ship of a country without a commercial treaty with the United
States); (2) Letter from James Monroe to James Madison (July 26, 1785), in 8 MADISON PAPERS 329
(Virginia congressional delegate explains that Congress has proposed to be granted the power to regulate
commerce to obtain reciprocity from other nations); (3) Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (Aug.
7, 1785), in 8 MADISON PAPERS 334-335 (saying “should G. B. persist in the machinations which distress
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us and seven or eight of the States be hindered by the others from obtaining relief by federal means, … I
tremble at the anti-federal experiments into which the former may be drawn”); (4) Letter from James
Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 20, 1785), in 8M ADISON PAPERS 500, 502 (saying that “if anything
should reconcile Virga. to the idea of giving Cong. a power over her trade, it will be that this power is
likely to annoy Great Br. against who the animosities of our Citizens is still strong[.]”); (5) James Madison,
Motion in the Virginia House of Delegates (Nov. 30, 1785), in 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 114 (proposing to
allow Congress to embargo or tax any foreign vessel to obtain privileges in foreign ports for U.S. vessels);
(6) Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 18, 1786), in 8 MADISON PAPERS 500, 502
(saying that if the Annapolis Convention should come to nothing, it will “confirm G.B. and all the world in
the belief that we are not to be respected, not apprehended as a nation in matters of commerce”); (7)
Edmund Randolph, Speech before the Federal Convention (May 29, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS 19
(Madison Notes)(saying that among the advantages that the U. S. might acquire are “counteraction of the
commercial regulations of other nations—pushing of commerce ad libitum—&c &c[.]”); (8) Letter from
Philippe Andre’ Joseph de Letombe to Comte de la Luzerne (June 26, 1787), in 18 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 197 (saying that adoption of the Constitution will unite the states and facilitate the desirable
Reciprocity of Commerce between U.S. and France); (9) Letter from James Bowdoin to George Erving
(Aug. 12, 1787), in 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 324 (saying that Great Britain’s system of commerce will
be altered when “congress under the new Constitution will have the power of regulating it within the Ports
of the United States”); (10) John Rutledge, Speech at the Federal Convention (Aug. 29, 1787), in 2
FARRAND’S RECORDS 452 (saying that gaining access to the West Indies is the “great object” of regulating
commerce); (11) Letter from Andrew Allen to Tench Coxe (Sept. 8, 1787), in 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
362 (arguing that Advocates of the Constitution are too sanguine in assuming adoption will immediately
extend Commerce or open new Channels of Trade); (12) JOHN JAY, ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE
OF NEW YORK 7

(Sept. 17, 1787), reprinted in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

(Paul Leicester Ford, ed. 1888) (hereinafter PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION)(saying that “other nations
taking advantage of [our] imbecility, are daily multiplying commercial restraints upon us” and that there is
“not one English, French or a Spanish island or port in the West-Indies to which an American vessel can
carry a cargo of flour for sale”); (13) SOCIAL COMPACT, NEW HAVEN GAZETTE (Oct. 4, 1787), reprinted in
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3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 356 (regretting the begging situation to which our commerce is reduced in
every part of the globe, the heavy duties and the exclusions from British ports); (14) MARCUS, DAILY
ADVERTISER, NEW YORK (Oct. 15, 1787), reprinted in 1 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 127 (arguing that
when commerce is a national object, nations will form treaties with us); (15) A LANDHOLDER I,
CONNECTICUT COURANT (Nov. 5-12 1787), reprinted in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 399-400 (arguing that
until the Constitution is effected, our commerce may be “insulted by every overgrown merchant in
Europe”); (16) THE FEDERALIST NO. 11, at 67 (Alexander Hamilton) (first published November 24, 1787)
(advocating a government in America, capable of excluding Great Britain from all ports); (17) James
Wilson, Speech before the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention (Nov. 24, 1787), in 2D OCUMENTARY
HISTORY 339, 360 (saying that being devoid of importance, we were unable to command a sale for
commodities in a foreign market); (18) A LANDHOLDER V, CONNECTICUT COURANT (Nov. 25 – Dec. 3,
1787), reprinted in 3D OCUMENTARY HISTORY 480 (arguing that without the Constitution “your
commerce, the price of your commodities, your riches, and your safety will be the sport of every foreign
adventurer”); (19) CANDIDUS I, (BOSTON) INDEPENDENT CHRONICLE (Dec. 6, 1787), reprinted in 4 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 128 (Herbert Storing, ed. 1981)(hereinafter THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST) (saying that “those nations laid these duties to promote their own fishery, &c. and … will
pursue their own politicks respecting our imports and exports, unless we can check them by some
commercial regulations”); (20) THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 136 (Alexander Hamilton) (first published
December 14, 1787) (saying that the want of a power to regulate commerce operated as a bar to the
formation of beneficial treaties with foreign powers); (21) Address of the Dissent of the minority of the
Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 18, 1987), in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 7, 14 (Anti-Federalists regretting
that “we are suffering from the restrictions of foreign nations, who had shackled our commerce, while we
were unable to retaliate”); (22) CENTINEL VI , PENNSYLVANIA PACKET (Dec. 25, 1787), reprinted in 15
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 98, 99 (an Anti-Federalist opponent nonetheless finding considerable benefit in
strengthening the hands of Congress, so as to enable them to regulate commerce and counteract the adverse
restrictions of other nations); (23) Edmund Randolph, Reasons for not Signing the Constitution, Richmond,
Virginia (Dec. 27, 1787), in 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 260, 265 (saying that the states can not organize
retaliation against foreign nations and what is needed is “exclusion …opposed to exclusion, and restriction

23

to restriction”); (24) Charles Pinckney, South Carolina House of Representatives (Jan. 16, 1788), in 4
ELLIOT’S DEBATES 253-54 (saying that the first great inconvenience of the Confederation was the
“destruction of our commerce, occasioned by the restrictions of other nations, whose policy it was not in
the power of the general government to counteract”); (25) Edward Rutledge, Debate in the South Carolina
Legislature (Jan. 16, 1788), in 2D EBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 23 (asking “could [the Articles] obtain
security for our commerce in any part of the world?”); (26) James Bowdoin, Massachusetts Ratification
Convention (Jan. 23, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 83 (saying that trade is in a miserable state because
other nations can prohibit our vessels from entering their ports or lay heavy duties on our exports, and we
can not prevent it because Congress has no retaliating or regulating power over their vessels and exports);
(27) Nathaniel Gorham, Massachusetts Ratification Convention (Jan. 25, 1788), in 2E LLIOT’S DEBATES
106 (saying that Great Britain “prohibit[s] our oil, fish, lumber, [etc.] from being imported into their
territories, in order to favor Nova Scotia, for they know we cannot make general retaliating laws”); (28)
Letter from Gaspard Joseph Amand Ducher to Comte de la Luzerne (Feb. 2, 1788), in 16 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 13 (saying that “the navigation acts of the states of Newhampshire and Massachusetts had been
suspended because the other states did not wish to proclaim similar ones, designed to punish England for its
strictness against american commerce’); (29) “THE FABRICK OF FREEDOM,” A SONG BY JONATHAN
WILLIAMS, JR., PHILADELPHIA FEDERAL GAZETTE (Mar. 8, 13, 1788), reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 361 (saying in part, “See Commerce with extended hand/ Flies the restraint of kings/ And foreign
riches to this land/ From ev’ry climate brings/”); (30) JOHN JAY, AN ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF THE
STATE OF NEW YORK (Spring 1788), in 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 501 (saying we should not continue “our
present humiliating condition, to give other nations further time to perfect their restrictive systems of
commerce, …and strengthen them by all those regulations and contrivances in which a jealous policy is
ever fruitful”); (31) “TO BE OR NOT TO BE? IS THE QUESTION,” NEW HAMPSHIRE GAZETTE (PORTSMOUTH)
(Apr. 16, 1788), reprinted in 2 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 407 (saying that the inconvenience that
foreign powers must suffer from a proper regulation of commerce by congress will oblige them to open
ports); (32) Letter from Comte de Moustier to Comte de Montmorin (May 29, 1788), in 18 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 145 (arguing that Americans are indignant that John Adams failed to get treaty of commerce so
that their flag is excluded from trading in the West Indies); (33) DAVID RAMSAY, ORATION, CHARLESTON

24

Navigation Act, granted a monopoly to its own vessels for entry into its West Indies
possessions in an attempt to capture the profits of shipping for its own nationals. Great
Britain also wanted to stimulate a strong merchant fleet that could train British seamen
for the Navy and could serve as auxiliary vessels in war. When the American states were
still colonies, the purpose of giving incentives to British shipping included especially
stimulating American shipping, and there was a very active trade between the West

COLUMBIAN HERALD (June 5, 1787), reprinted in 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 163 (saying that “[o]ur
protected commerce will open new channels for our native commodities, and give additional value to the
soil, by increasing the demand for its productions”); (34) James Monroe, Speech to Virginia Ratification
Convention (June 10, 1788), in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 213 (Anti-Federalist saying that commercial treaties
would be no advantage because there is no probability of opening the West or East Indies to U.S. ships);
(35) Letter from George Washington to Marquis de Lafayette (June 18, 1788), in 18 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 184 (referring to time “when foreign nations shall be disposed to give us equal advantages in
commerce from dread of retaliation[.]”); (36) NEW JERSEY JOURNAL (June 18, 1788), reprinted in 18
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 185 (saying that “[t]he moment the English know we can retaliate, that moment
they will relax in their restrictions on our commerce—and that moment will never arrive until our union is
consolidated”); (37) William R. Davie, North Carolina Ratification Convention (July 24, 1788), in 4
ELLIOT’S DEBATES 18 (arguing that the United States should be empowered to compel foreign nations into
commercial regulations and counter British insults); (38) James Madison, Preface To Debates in the
Convention of 1787 (c. 1830), in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS 547 (describing the reasons for the Constitution
to include “the want of authority in Congress to regulate Commerce, [which] had produced in Foreign
nations particularly G.B. a monopolizing policy injurious to the trade of the U.S. and destructive to their
navigation.”)
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Indies and American ports. When America achieved independence, however, Britain
decided that there was no reason to let American vessels into its West Indian ports.54
The grievance, however, was generalized to include the power to retaliate against
France and Spain for similar exclusions. All great trading nations were said to have tried
“to secure to themselves the advantages of their carrying trade.”55 John Jay complained
that because of our “imbecility,” all the empires were imposing “commercial restraints
upon us” so that there is “not one English, French or a Spanish island or port in the WestIndies to which an American vessel can carry a cargo of flour for sale.”56 Without a
Constitution, proponents argued, our commerce would be “insulted by every overgrown
merchant in Europe“57 and “your commerce, the price of your commodities, your riches,
and your safety will be the sport of every foreign adventurer.”58 Britain’s system of
commerce will be altered, former Governor James Bowdoin told the Massachusetts
Ratification Convention, only when “congress under the new Constitution will have the
54

LORD SHEFFIELD, OBSERVATIONS ON THE COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES 264-265 (6th ed. 1784),

described in JOHN E. CROWLEY, THE PRIVILEGES OF INDEPENDENCE: NEOMERCANTILISM AND THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 81-83 (1993) and STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK: THE AGE OF FEDERALISM
69 (1993).
55

Thomas Russell, Speech to the Massachusetts Ratification Convention (Feb. 1, 1788), in 2E LLIOT’S

DEBATES 139.
56

JOHN JAY, ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 7 (Sept. 17, 1787), reprinted in

PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION.
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A LANDHOLDER I, CONNECTICUT COURANT (Nov. 5-12 1787), reprinted in 3D OCUMENTARY HISTORY

399-400.
58

A LANDHOLDER V, CONNECTICUT COURANT (Nov. 25 – Dec. 3, 1787), reprinted in 3D OCUMENTARY

HISTORY 480.
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power of regulating it within the Ports of the United States.”59 What was needed, said
Edmund Randolph, is “exclusion … opposed to exclusion, and restriction to
restriction.”60 Even the threat of retaliation, Washington wrote, would induce foreign
powers to give the United States beneficial commercial treaties.61
A retaliatory impost or embargo required a uniform national policy for all
American ports. When Massachusetts had tried to impose a penalty tax on British ships
to force open the ports of the British West Indies, other states had undercut her by
welcoming British ships into their ports.62 For an embargo or impost to be effective, it
59

Letter from James Bowdoin to George Erving (Aug. 12, 1787), in 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 324.

60

Edmund Randolph, Reasons for not Signing the Constitution (Dec. 27, 1787), in 8D OCUMENTARY

HISTORY 260, 265.
61

Letter from George Washington to Marquis de Lafayette (June 18, 1788), in 18 DOCUMENTARY

HISTORY 184 (saying that “when foreign nations shall be disposed to give us equal advantages in
commerce from dread of retaliation.”); Letter from Philippe Andre’ Joseph de Letombe to Comte de la
Luzerne (June 26, 1787), in 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 197 (saying that adoption of Constitution will
unite the states and facilitate the desirable Reciprocity of Commerce between U.S. and France); MARCUS,
DAILY ADVERTISER, NEW YORK (Oct. 15, 1787), reprinted in 1 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 127
(arguing that when commerce is a national object, nations will form treaties with us); James Wilson,
Speech to the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention (Nov. 26, 1787), in 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 431 (saying
that “[d]evoid of national importance, we could not procure, for our exports a tolerable sale at foreign
markets”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 136 (Alexander Hamilton)(first published December 14, 1787)
(saying that the want of a power to regulate commerce operated as a bar to the formation of beneficial
treaties with foreign powers).
62

Letter from Gaspard Joseph Amand Ducher to Comte de la Luzerne (Feb. 2, 1788), in 16

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 13 (saying that Massachusetts and New Hampshire had both attempted an
exclusion of British ships to punish Britain for its strictness against American commerce, but had
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could not be open to an easy and free end run through a neighboring state. New York
had tried to impose a discriminatory impost on foreign goods brought in from New Jersey
or Connecticut in order to try to enforce New York’s retaliatory exclusions against the
British.63 The states would clearly have to present a united front.
Retaliation against the British exclusions was even sometimes said to be the
primary purpose of the Constitution. Charles Pinckney argued to the South Carolina
House of Representatives that the first great inconvenience of the Confederation was the
destruction of our commerce because the general government could not counteract the
restrictions of other nations.64 Shortly before the Annapolis Convention, Madison wrote
to Jefferson that “if anything should reconcile Virga. to the idea of giving Cong. a power
over her trade, it will be that this power is likely to annoy G.B. against whom the
animosities of our Citizens are still strong.”65 Even staunch Anti-Federalists endorsed the

suspended the attempt because the competing ports in other states would not join the embargo and so got
the advantage of British ships newly attracted to their ports.)
63

JENSEN, supra note 40, at 339. Jensen also says that the Anti-New Jersey and Connecticut imposts did

not mean very much, however, because neither Connecticut nor New Jersey had reasonable deep water
ports, so that running around the New York harbor was highly inconvenient.
64

Charles Pinckney, South Carolina House of Representatives (Jan. 16, 1788), in 4E LLIOT’S DEBATES

253-54. Consistently, Professor John Crowley has said that “[i]n the name of seeking power to regulate
commerce, Congress really only sought authority for retaliatory Navigation Acts." CROWLEY, supra note
54, at 94.
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Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 20, 1785), in 8M ADISON PAPERS 344. See also

Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 18, 1786), in 8 MADISON PAPERS 500, 502 (saying
that “if [the Annapolis Conference] should come to nothing, it will I fear confirm G.B. and all the world in
the belief that we are not to be respected, nor apprehended as a nation in matters of commerce”).
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idea that the new government should be empowered to impose a retaliatory impost to
open up the British West Indies to American ships.66
Whatever the perceived importance of the power to retaliate against the British,
however, the proposal to retaliate came to nothing. On the first working day of the
Congress under the new Constitution, Madison introduced his proposal for an impost.
His bill would raise federal revenue, but it also would have discriminated against British
ships. “The union by the establishment of a more effective government ,” Madison said,
“[has] recovered from [its] state of [impotence and] imbecility, that ... prevented a
performance of its duties.”67 Discrimination, that is, a higher impost on British ships,
might give Great Britain a motive to enter into a commercial treaty, but even if Great
While retaliation against the British was not the only purpose for the Constitution, it does seem to
have been the primary focus for the Annapolis Convention, which was an important stepping stone to the
Philadelphia convention. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF
THE CONSTITUTION

32 (1996); NORMAN K. RISJORD, CHESAPEAKE POLITICS, 1781-1800, at 257-266

(1978). See also RISJORD, at 251-266 for a discussion of how giving Congress the power over commerce
contributed to the Constitutional movement in Virginia.
66

Address of the Dissent of the Minority of the Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 18, 1987), in 15

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 7, 14 (regretting that “we are suffering from the restrictions of foreign nations,
who had shackled our commerce, while we were unable to retaliate[.]”); CENTINEL VI (ANTI-FEDERALIST),
PENNSYLVANIA PACKET (Dec. 25, 1787), reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 98, 99 (finding
considerable benefit in strengthening the hands of Congress, so as to counteract the adverse restrictions of
other nations.)
67

James Madison, Speech Before the House of Representative (Apr. 8, 1789), in 1A NNALS OF CONGRESS

107. See also Speech before the House of Representatives (Apr. 21, 1787), in 1A NNALS OF CONGRESS 193
(arguing we will not give Great Britain a motive for entering into a treaty unless we discriminate against
them.)
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Britain did not respond, Madison hoped, the discriminatory impost would move
American commerce away from Britain into its more “natural channels,” for instance,
France.68
The Senate, however, lead by the New York delegation, stripped the anti-British
discrimination features from the 1789 impost bill.69 Great Britain allowed American
ships into the British home ports without restriction or discrimination and opponents of
retaliation feared that Britain might retaliate in turn if faced with American port
restrictions.70 The House acceded to the Senate and Madison’s plan for discrimination
against the British failed to be part of the enacted impost.71 As Stanley Elkins and Eric
McKitrick put it, “Madison hardly pictured himself as a spokesman for the interests of

68

Speeches before the House of Representatives (Apr. 21, 1789), in 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 191, 193

(trade with Britain is an “artificial channel” larger than natural.)
69

ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 54, at 766, n. 66 collects the evidence for the New York merchants

opposing discrimination. While there was no specifically anti-British discriminations, there were
differentials in whether goods were imported in American ships, discussed in text accompanying infra
notes 138-140.
70

Editorial note, in 12 MADISON PAPERS 55; Editorial note, in 12 JEFFERSON PAPERS 521-526. Cf. John

Laurence, Speech in the House of Representatives (Apr. 21, 1789), in 1A NNALS OF CONGRESS 192
(arguing that England does not now discriminate against American vessels coming into England.)
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An Act for Laying Duties on Goods, Wares and Merchandise Imported in the United States, July 4,

1789, 1 STAT. 24-27. May 16 and May 26, 1789, in 1A NNALS OF CONGRESS 365-66, 409 (5% impost
passes but discrimination defeated.)
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American merchants. Indeed, when merchants objected to his plan, he turned his
hostility upon them, charging that they were unduly subservient to British influence.”72
A retaliatory impost against British shipping probably never was a good idea.
The British were intransigent on the subject. After independence they reviewed their
policy and decided that allowing American ships into the British West Indies would just
enrich a rival shipper and encourage more American ships. Britain also rightly
considered that it had the best and cheapest manufactured goods and gave the best credit
on the globe so that it need not worry about Americans trying to cut off access to British
exports, whatever their desires.73 There were also not very many British ships coming
into American ports against which to retaliate because American shipping was on its way
to monopolizing transatlantic shipping. By 1796, American ships, by successful
competition and American oak, were carrying over 90% of the transatlantic commerce.74

72

ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 54, at 88. See also id., at 432 (referring to the “ideological liability,

that of Madison’s stubborn commitment to a system of coercive legislation against the commerce of Great
Britain.”)
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SHEFFIELD, at 264-265, described in ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 54, at 69-71. Consistently, see

Letter from Andrew Allen to Tench Coxe (Sept. 8, 1787), in 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 362 (arguing that
proponents of the Constitution are “too sanguine in assuming adoption will immediately extend commerce
or open new channels of trade.”); ROBERT B. MORRIS, THE FORGING OF THE UNION, 1781-1789, at 194
(1987)(citing a British merchant who responded to the threat of American sanctions by saying “Pish”).
Madison, by contrast, argued that America could retaliate against Britain, because in the case of a war of
commercial relations between the two nations, the loss to Great Britain’s commerce and manufactures
would be severe. James Madison, Speech to the House of Representatives, June 25, 1790, 13 MADISON
PAPERS 255, 256.
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ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 54, at 414 (93%).
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A penalty against British ships would not have been much of an economic stick, even if it
extinguished the last of them. Penalties would also have angered the British, perhaps into
retaliation against American ships going into British ports. American transatlantic
shipping into Great Britain was important to the commercial states and America could
not afford a prohibitory trade war with Great Britain. The British West Indies
prohibitions on American ships, moreover, were porous; the islands themselves were
happy to evade the prohibitions on American trade and encourage smuggling.75 For
Virginia, finally, leaving American vessels as the only bidders for the shipping of
Virginia crops by excluding British ships from American ports would have raised
shipping costs or lowered crop prices, both to the detriment of Virginia.76 Madison’s
discriminatory impost is probably best understood as driven by ideological hatred of
Britain, more than by any reasonable view of American self interest.77
75

See, e.g., id., at 131 (finding a treaty opening West Indies would just confirm what was already

accessible informally.)
76

But see Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 20, 1784), in 8M ADISON PAPERS 102-

104 (saying that he wanted regulation of trade only to reduce the trade of Great Britain to an equality with
other nations and not to make a mercantile element rich.)
77

See the discussion in ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 54, at 131, 375-387, 432 (arguing that Madison

seeking the retributional impost in both 1789 and 1794 was relying on “exploded dogmas and bad
economics” and that Madison had an “ideological liability,” i.e., a “stubborn commitment to a system of
coercive legislation against the commerce of Great Britain.”)
Madison and Jefferson did see retribution against the British differently. Madison believed that
the British would have to cave in because “the farmer can live better without the shop-keeper than the
shop-keeper without the farmer." James Madison, Speech to the House of Representatives on Navigation
and Trade (May 13, 1790), in 13 MADISON PAPERS 211, 213. For Jefferson in Paris, the failure of the
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The punitive impost cannot be given much weight to explain the Constitution,
notwithstanding how prominently it shows up in the Constitutional debates. The failure
of Congress to endorse the proposal in 1789 serves as a deliberative poll of the sentiment
of the nation, about as close to the adoption as the Constitution as we can ask for, and the
poll was unfavorable to the retribution. The country, when asked, did not want the
remedy. The retaliatory impost was plausibly a part of Madison’s thinking, and that
alone makes it part of the cause of the Constitution, but Madison could not get a majority
for retaliation, over opposition both in Virginia and in the shipping states. A proposal
that failed to pass even after it was allowable under the ratified Constitution cannot be
used as a strong explanation of why the Constitutional revolution was needed or adopted.
3. American Mercantilism.
While the Framers objected to British restrictions requiring that only British ships
could supply the British West Indies, they simultaneously wanted to require that
American products could be carried only in American ships. The commerce clause gave
Congress the power to imitate the same British Navigation Act exclusions, objected to

retributional impost of British shipping hurt France, which had “spent money and blood” for the American
cause and helped Britain, which had “moved heaven, earth and hell to exterminate us.” Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 28, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 364, 366367 (Julian P. Boyd, ed. 1950)(hereinafter JEFFERSON PAPERS). For descriptions of the issue more
sympathetic to Jefferson and Madison views on anti-British discrimination see Drew R. McCoy,
Republicanism and American Foreign Policy: James Madison and the Political Economy of Commercial
Discrimination, 1789 to 1794, 31 WM. & MARY Q. 633 (3d series 1974) and Julian Boyd, editorial note, 8
MADISON PAPERS 64.
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above, so as to give United States vessels exclusive monopolies on shipping American
commodities out of United States ports (30 cites and 22%).78
78

(1) Alexander Hamilton, Continentalist V (Apr. 18, 1782), in 3P APERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 75,

78 (Harold C. Syrett, ed. 1961-1987)(hereinafter HAMILTON PAPERS)(arguing that Dutch commercial
regulations “are more rigid and numerous, than those of any other country; and it is by a judicious and
unremitted vigilance of government, that they have been able to extend their traffic to a degree so much
beyond their natural and comparative advantages”); (2) Richard Henry Lee to — (Oct. 10, 1785), 2 Letters
389, in 2 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 482 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner, eds. 1987)(hereinafter
THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION)(arguing that the Northern and Southern states are so different that “ the
Staple States should oppose the plan of vesting powers for the restraint & regulation of Commerce in
Congress … whose Constituents are very differently circumstanced”); (3) Gouverneur Morris, Debate at
the Federal Convention (Aug. 29, 1787), in 2F ARRAND’S RECORDS 451 (Madison Notes)(opposing
requiring two-thirds vote for the regulation of commerce because encouraging American ships and seamen
would reduce Southern produce costs and improve security); (5) Mr. Williamson (Aug. 29, 1787), in id.
(saying that if “Northern States should push their regulations [of commerce] too far, the S. States would
build ships for themselves”); (6) Charles Pinkney, Speech in the Federal Convention (Aug. 29, 1787), in 2
FARRAND’S RECORDS 449 (saying that the interests of the Southern states were against regulation of
commerce; but that he thought it proper to allow power of making commercial regulations because of the
concessions that the North had made); (7) James Wilson, Speech before the Federal Convention (Sept. 14,
1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS 616 (Madison Notes)(saying that power to grant monopolies and
corporations was included in the power to regulate commerce); (8) George Mason, Speech before the
Federal Convention (Sept. 14, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS 616 (Madison Notes)(opposing
monopolies and arguing that the power to regulate commerce does not include the power to give
incorporation); (9) Eldridge Gerry, Speech before the Federal Convention (Sept. 15, 1787), in 2
FARRAND’S RECORDS 635 (Rufus King Notes)(opposing giving Congress power to regulate commerce
because it will enable it to “create corporations and monopolies”); (10) George Mason, Speech before the
Federal Convention (Sept. 15, 1787), in 2F ARRAND’S RECORDS 639 (Madison Notes), 635 (King
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Notes)(asking for a two-thirds majority for the adoption of Navigation Acts to prevent “a few rich
merchants” in New York, Philadelphia and Boston from monopolizing shipping and reducing the value of
southern crops by perhaps one-half); (11) U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 9, cl. 6 (providing that no “Preference
shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of
another”); (12) Letter from North Carolina Delegates to Gov. Richard Caswell (Sept. 18, 1787), in 13
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 215, 216 (saying that “[a] navigation Act or the Power to regulate Commerce in
the Hands of the National Government by which American Ships and Seamen may be fully employed is the
desirable weight that is thrown into the Northern Scale”); (13) Alexander Hamilton, Conjectures About the
New Constitution (Sept. 1787), in 1 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 9 (saying the good will of the
commercial interests throughout the states will give all its efforts to the Constitution to establish a
government capable of regulating, protecting and extending commerce); (14) Letter from Richard Henry
Lee to George Mason (Oct. 1, 1787), in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 28 (saying that the “Commercial
plunder of the South stimulates the rapacious Trader”); (15) George Mason: Objections to the Constitution
(Oct. 7, 1787), in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 346, 350 (saying that by requiring only a majority to make
all “Commercial & Navigation Laws, the five Southern States … will be ruined; [because laws] may be
made as will enable the Merchants of the Northern & Eastern States not only to demand an exorbitant
Freight, but to monopolize the Purchase of the Commodities at their own Price”); (16) THE LANDHOLDER
VI, CONNECTICUT COURANT (Dec. 10, 1787), reprinted in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS 164 (arguing that Mason
opposed the Constitution because “a navigation act might otherwise be passed excluding foreign bottoms
from carrying American produce to market, and throw a monopoly of the carrying business into the hands
of the eastern states who attend to navigation”); (17) AGRIPPA VI, MASSACHUSETTS GAZETTE (Dec. 14,
1787), reprinted in 4D OCUMENTARY HISTORY 426, 428 (opposing Congressional power to grant exclusive
charters because they would be “injurious to … commerce, by enhancing prices and destroying …
rivalship”); (18) THE FEDERALIST NO. 12, at 73 (Alexander Hamilton) (first published Nov. 27, 1787)
(praising the fostering of commerce so as to increase the circulation of precious metals, invigorate the
channels of industry and boost government revenue); (19) AGRIPPA XIV, MASSACHUSETTS GAZETTE (Jan.
25 1788), reprinted in 5D OCUMENTARY HISTORY 821 (saying that while a system of commerce established
by national authority would be beneficial in some respects, still most governments establish companies that
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have ill effects on trade and that “as we are situated at one extreme of the empire, two or three such
companies would annihilate the importance of our seaports, by transferring the trade to Philadelphia”); (20)
Thomas Dawes, Massachusetts Ratification Convention (Jan. 21, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 58
(objecting that without the Constitution’s regulation of commerce, “a vessel from Roseway or Halifax finds
as hearty a welcome with its fish and whalebone at the southern ports, as though it was built, navigated, and
freighted from Salem or Boston”); (21) James Bowdoin, Speech in the Massachusetts Ratification
Convention (Feb. 1, 1788), in 2E LLIOT’S DEBATES 129 (arguing that well being of trade depends upon the
proper regulation of it and unregulated trade has ruined rather than enriched those who carry it on); (22)
Thomas Russell, Speech in the Massachusetts Ratification Convention (Feb. 1, 1788), in 2E LLIOT’S
DEBATES 139 (arguing that Congress should confine shipping to American vessels, just as all the great
trading nations have benefited “from securing to themselves the advantages of their carrying trade”); (23)
Amendments to the Constitution Recommended by the Massachusetts Ratification Convention (Feb. 6,
1788), in 2E LLIOT’S DEBATES 177 (recommending that Congress erect no company of merchants with
exclusive advantages of commerce); (24) HUGH WILLIAMSON, SPEECH AT EDENTON, NORTH CAROLINA,
NOVEMBER 8, 1787, PRINTED IN THE DAILY ADVERTISER (NEW YORK) (Feb. 25 – 27, 1788), reprinted in 2
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 227, 231 (saying that “[b]y the sundry regulations of commerce, it will be
in the power of Government not only to collect a vast revenue for the general benefit of the nation, but to
secure the carrying trade in the hands of citizens in preference to strangers”); (25) Letter from John Howard
to George Thatcher (Feb. 27, 1788), in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 230 (saying that wise commercial
regulations will reduce imports of foreign luxuries in foreign ships to one-tenth and end the current
situation where “our own vessels are rotting in the docks, our seamen strolling the streets, and our
merchants daily becoming bankrupt”); (26) NORFOLK AND PORTSMOUTH JOURNAL (Mar. 12, 1788),
reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 380 (saying that gentlemen of Virginia opposing the Constitution
“fear, that a majority of the states may establish regulations of commerce which will give great advantage
to the carrying trade of America and be a means of encouraging New England vessels rather than old
England”); (27) Letter from Pierce Butler to Weedon Butler (May 5, 1788), in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS 303
(saying that “Southern or Staple States accommodated to the Northern states by allowing a Navigation Act
giving them exclusive carrying of commodities, although Southern States would of course have lower
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The Constitution was written long before Adam Smith, laissez faire and free trade
came to dominate economic philosophy.79 It is not uncommon to find descriptions of the
Constitutional document as “a part of the liberal, free trade tradition,”80 but those
descriptions have to be understood as solely aspirational.
Both Hamilton and Madison were mercantilists, by their participation in the
serious thinking of the times. Mercantilism focused on stimulating foreign exports and
discourage foreign imports so as to maximize the domestic supply of specie.
Mercantilism assumed that government should actively stimulate exports by giving

freight costs if ships of every Nation may come into their ports”); (28) Letter from Richard Henry Lee to
Edmund Pendleton (May 26, 1788), in 2 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 465 (saying that the danger of
monopolized trade may be avoided by requiring three-fourths of the states to approve regulations of
commerce); (29) Alexander Hamilton, Debate in New York Ratification Convention (June 20, 1788), in 2
ELLIOT’S DEBATES 236 (saying that it was in the interest of the Northern States that “they should have full
power, by a majority in Congress, to make commercial regulations in favor of their own, and in restraint of
the navigation of foreigners”); (30) John Lansing, Resolution in New York Ratification Convention (July 2,
1788), in 2E LLIOT’S DEBATES 407 (moving that “nothing in the Constitution contained shall be construed
to authorize Congress to grant monopolies, or erect any company with exclusive advantages of
commerce.”)
79

See, e.g., DOUGLAS IRWIN, AGAINST THE TIDE: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF FREE TRADE 80

(1996)(Adam Smith’s free trade ideas did not begin to get cited as orthodoxy among economists until at
least a quarter century after they were published in 1776); CROWLEY, supra note 54, at xi (saying that a
book about the influence of Smith on the American revolutionary generation would be “very short.”)
80

See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV.

511, 527 (2000)(describing the Madisonian Constitution as very much a part of the liberal, free trade
tradition).

37

monopolies and bounties, and should also discourage imports by taxes and restriction.81
Hamilton’s argument, in Federalist 12, that stimulation of foreign trade would contribute
to the wealth of the whole nation is a fine example of mercantilist philosophy:
The prosperity of commerce [i.e., foreign trade] is now perceived and
acknowledged, by all enlightened statesmen, to be the most useful as well
as the most productive source of national wealth; and has accordingly
become a primary object of their political cares. By multiplying the means
of gratification, by promoting the introduction and circulation of the
precious metals, those darling objects of human avarice and enterprise,
[foreign trade] serves to vivify and invigorate the channels of industry, and
to make them flow with greater activity and copiousness… .
It has been found in various countries, that in proportion as
[foreign trade] has flourished, land has risen in value… . The ability of a
country to pay taxes must always be proportioned, in a great degree, to the
quantity of money in circulation, and to the celerity with which it
circulates. Commerce [foreign trade], contributing to both these objects,
must of necessity render the payment of taxes easier, and facilitate the
requisite supplies to the treasury. The hereditary dominions of the
Emperor of Germany contain a great extent of fertile, cultivated and
populous territory, a large proportion of which is situated in mild and
luxuriant climates. In some parts of this territory are to be found the best
gold and silver mines in Europe. And yet, from the want of the fostering
influence of commerce [foreign trade], that monarch can boast but slender
revenues.82
Mercantilism as a philosophy disapproved of imports, in part because they caused
the outflow of the precious specie that would stimulate internal exchanges. For example,
“Honestus,” in New York in 1785 blamed New York’s economic problems on the
unfavorable balance of trade that drew gold and silver out of New York. Merchants were
the “bane and pest” of the Country, Honestus claimed, because without them, luxuries
would not be imported in such huge volume.83 The Constitutional debates are also filled
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See, e.g, CROWLEY, supra note 54. at 28 (tracing the ideas back to the 14th century.)
THE FEDERALIST NO. 12, at 73-5 (Alexander Hamilton)(first published Nov. 27, 1787).
HONESTUS, NEW YORK PACKET (Mar. 27, 1785), quoted in KAMINSKI, supra note 17, at 99.
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with moral condemnation of imported luxuries. Federalist Tench Coxe condemned the
“ineffectual” federal government under the Articles for its inability to control the
“wonton consumption” of imported luxuries.84 “Devoid of national power,” James
Wilson regretted to Pennsylvania, “we could not prohibit the extravagance of our
importations nor could we derive a revenue from their excess.”85 “Wise commercial
regulations,” said Federalist John Howard, “will reduce imports of foreign luxuries in
foreign ships to one-tenth.”86 We need a controlling Union government to regulate
commerce, George Washington wrote, to balance against the “luxury, effeminacy and
corruption” introduced by foreign trade.87 On his inauguration in 1789, Washington was
to wear “a great rarity” –“ a suit made from cloth woven in the United States.”88
Anti-Federalist opponents of the Constitution were no friendlier to imported
luxuries. In the Philadelphia Convention, George Mason had “descanted,” Madison tells

84

TENCH COXE, AN ENQUIRY INTO PRINCIPLES ON WHICH A COMMERCIAL SYSTEM SHOULD BE FOUNDED

(1787)(regretting that “ineffectual and disjointed” federal government should not be able to overcome the
“wonton” consumption of imported luxuries.)
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James Wilson, Speech before the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention (Nov. 26, 1787), in 2 ELLIOT’S

DEBATES 431.
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Letter from John Howard to George Thatcher (Feb. 27, 1788), in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 230.
See, e.g., Letter from George Washington to James Warren (Oct. 7, 1785), in 3P APERS OF GW:

CONFEDERATION SERIES 298, 299-300 (W. Abbott, ed. 1994)(hereinafter PAPERS OF GW: CS)(arguing for
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us, on the necessity of restricting the “excessive consumption of foreign superfluities.”89
Patrick Henry argued to Virginia that we buy too much and make too little and that a
mere change in government would not cure the causes.90 John Lansing opened the AntiFederalist opposition in the New York Ratification debate with a fine mercantilist
diagnosis, arguing that the cause of current embarrassments is want of money arising,
because ‘[o]n the termination of war, … we launched into every species of extravagance,
and imported European goods to an amount far beyond our ability to pay.”91 The French
Counsel reported home that the New York opponents of Constitution wanted fewer
commercial ties with Europe, which only furnishes them with “luxuries that they must do
without to live in the simplicity that befits a newborn State.”92 The wearing of British
machine-woven woolens was considered immoral: “How many thousands are daily
wearing the manufactures of Europe, when, by a little industry and frugality, they might
wear those of their own country,” Anti-Federalist John Williams complained to New
York.93 Mercantilism’s general espousal of frugality and disapproval of imported
89

George Mason, Debate in the Federal Convention (Sept. 13, 1787), in 2F ARRAND’S RECORDS 539

(Madison notes).
90

Patrick Henry, Speech before the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 9, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT’S

DEBATES 157.
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John Lansing, Speech before the New York Ratification Convention (June 20, 1787), in 2E LLIOT’S

DEBATES 218.
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Letter from Comte de Moustier to Comte de Montmorin (June 25, 1787), in 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY

190.
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John Williams, Speech before the New York Ratification Convention (June 21, 1788), in 2E LLIOT’S

DEBATES 240 (calling for abandoning all the foreign commodities that “have deluged our country, which
loaded us with debt”); See also “A CITIZEN OF DUTCHESS COUNTY”, NEW YORK PACKET (Mar. 27, 1785),
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luxuries can, indeed, be traced back for at least the prior hundred years.94 The
participants in the ratification debates all approved of restricting imports and keeping
specie at home, whether they were for or against the Constitution.
Regulations of commerce included subsidies as well as restrictions. Even AntiFederalists believed, in the spirit of their times, that trade “cannot flourish, unless a
power is somewhere vested, to cherish those Branches of Commercial Intercourse which
are favorable to the Nation, and to check those of a contrary tendency.”95 Hamilton as
early as 1781 had argued that the Congress needed the “Power of Regulating Trade,
comprehending a right of giving bounties and premiums by way of encouragement.”96
Mercantilism also praised government restrictions in general. In 1782, Hamilton,
thinking as a mercantilist, had argued in favor of active government regulation of
commerce. Dutch commercial regulations, he said, “are more rigid and numerous, than
those of any other country; and it is by a judicious and unremitting vigilance of
government, that they have been able to extend their traffic to a degree so much beyond
quoted in KAMINSKI, supra note 17, at 99 (suggesting New York should prohibit importation of all foreign
articles that might be made among us and impose high imposts on all imported luxuries); George Mason
(Sept. 13, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS 606 (Madison’s Notes)(advocating regulation of commerce to
discourage foreign superfluities and to encourage American economy, frugality and manufactures). Cf.
Rebecca Starr, Political Mobilization, 1765-1776, in JACK GREEN & J.R. POLE, THE BLACKWELL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

231, 238 (1991)(saying that pledge to use homespun cloth
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their natural and comparative advantages.”97 James Bowdoin argued before the
Massachusetts Ratification Convention, consistently, that the well being of trade depends
upon the proper regulation of it and that unregulated trade would ruin rather than enrich
those who carry it on.98 George Washington argued that “it behoves us to place
[commerce] in its most convenient channels, under proper regulation – freed as much as
possible from those veins which luxury … naturally produces.”99 Hamilton denounced
the argument that trade would regulate itself as a “wild speculative paradox[ ] …
contrary to the sense of the most enlightened nations.”100 Madison joined in the
enthusiasm, denouncing those who were “decoying the people into a belief that trade
ought to be left to regulate itself.”101
In true mercantilist terms, James Madison seems to have explained the whole
destitution of the federal level and state encroachments upon federal rights in terms of an
absence of regulation of foreign commerce and an unfavorable balance of trade:
Another unhappy effect of the present anarchy of our commerce will be a
continuance of the unfavorable balance on it, which by draining us of our metals
furnishes pretexts for the pernicious substitution of paper money, for indulgence
to debtors and for postponement of taxes. In fact, most of our political errors may
be traced up to our commercial ones, and most of moral [errors] may to our
political [errors].”102
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Even federalization of the state imposts can be explained in mercantilist terms, as
allowing for a better suppression of imports. The states undercut each other on impost
tax rates to draw ships to their own ports. Only the federal government could enforce a
uniform rate that would produce significant revenue that would regulate imports and
suppress them.

James Wilson, for example, told the Pennsylvania ratification

convention the Articles of Confederation needed to be replaced because “[d]evoid of
power, we could neither prevent the excessive importations which lately deluged the
country, nor even raise from that excess a contribution to the public revenue.”103 Only
high taxes on imports could suppress the corruption of wonton luxurious consumption
that imports represented.
The federal government was prohibited from taxing exports104 and that is best
explained by mercantilism. A ban on federal tax of exports is not explained by fear of the
discriminatory abuse by New York (and other commercial states) monopolizing the taxes
from its deep water harbor at the expense of its neighbors. Arguably, the ban on export
taxes was just favoritism toward the South, which had the most commodities for export.
Still, mercantilism favored exports because they would bring specie into the country, and
a tax on exports would suppress them. Thus the Constitutional scheme, a federal tax on
imports, but not on exports, was consistent with the dominant economics even without
any favoritism.
In 1789 in the new Congress, James Madison professed to be “the friend to a very
free system of commerce” and also said that “if industry and labour are left to take their
103
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own course, they will generally be directed to those objects which are the most
productive.”105 He promptly listed as necessary exceptions, however, every program then
even vaguely contemplated to restrict the free flow: Congress should impose regulatory
imposts to induce foreign ports not to exclude American ships, to encourage American
shipping, to foster local manufacturing, to discourage consumption of disfavored goods,
to embargo in time of war, to encourage domestic war supplies independent of foreign
sources, and to obtain revenue.106 By the time he had finished his list, the exceptions had
swallowed the free trade. Indeed, given that Madison had condemned those who were
“decoying the people into a belief that trade ought to be left to regulate itself”107 and had
traced most of our political and moral errors to the imports that drained us of our precious
metals,108 the surprising, the insincere part of Madison’s 1789 address to the House was
the opening claim that he was “friend to every free system of commerce.”
Once free trade replaced mercantilism as an economic philosophy, thanks mostly
to the work of Adam Smith, importing British woolens and other manufactured goods
came to be seen as a wise decision to buy the highest quality goods at the best price
abroad, rather than wasting resources doing an inferior job more expensively at home. If
there is one truth that economists across the political spectrum now agree on it is that the
wealth of the nation cannot be generally improved by banning imports.109 When Adam
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Smith took hold, importing machine-woven woolen clothing no longer looked like such a
moral sin.
Madison and the other proponents of the Constitution had also advocated specific
programs in the ratification debates that were inconsistent with free trade.
a. Port Preferences. In 1784, Madison, in the spirit of mercantilism, had
sponsored a port bill in the Virginia Assembly, which would have required that all trade
between Virginians and foreign parts had to be conducted out of a single Virginia port.
By giving a monopoly or franchise to one Virginia port, Madison wanted to establish a
Baltimore or Philadelphia in Virginia. Madison complained that prices for Virginia
export tobacco were 15-20% higher on the Philadelphia wharves than in Virginia.110 The
Port monopoly would capture the premium for Virginians and encourage development of
Virginian port facilities. Port monopolies had been actively used by Britain to protect its
industry and subsidize its ports.111 The port preferences have been said to be the
economic “centerpiece” of the Madison’s coalition out of which the Constitutional

literature saying that while free trade and comparative advantage arguments are “not passe, [they] have lost
their innocence,” see Paul. R. Krugman, Is Free Trade Passe?, 1 J. ECON. PERSP. 131 (1987). See also
DOUGLAS IRWIN, supra note 94, which includes discussions of where exceptions to free trade might be
justified.
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(1910)(stating that American iron exports had been required to go first to the port of London, while
Carolina rice exports were allowed to by-pass Britain entirely.)
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movement arose.112 Both Thomas Jefferson113 and George Washington114 supported the
port monopoly idea.
As the Virginia legislature considered Madison’s bill, the ports included within
the monopoly were expanded to two, Alexandria and Norfolk, and then to four, adding
Bermuda’s Hundred (below Richmond on the James River) and Tappahannock (below
Fredericksburg on the Rappahannock River). By 1786, the monopoly had been diluted to
include 17 listed Virginia ports.115 The Virginia legislature also exempted Virginiaowned ships from the port restrictions.116
Madison denied that he meant to sacrifice the “conveniency” of planters to
provide incentives for merchants,117 but the monopoly nonetheless seems motivated by
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allowing the listed ports to charge a premium for shipping Virginia crops. Plausibly,
Virginia as a whole would not be helped by the port monopoly even if it succeeded: The
15-20% premium for tobacco on Philadelphia wharves was probably a price buyers were
willing to pay for the convenience of using the well-developed wharves of a wellprotected, deep-water port. If so, then buyers would not pay the premium for less
convenient Virginia shallow-water docks. Any premium available for the Virginia ports
would then just reduce the sale price available to the planters. Madison’s port preference,
as Professor Risjord describes it, “was solidly grounded in mercantilist thought, if not
common sense.”118 Madison also had an anti-British motive: he was afraid of reestablishment of the colonial trade ties between Britain and the planters if British ships
were to dock at the bottom of each planter’s dock119 and, once again, anti-British
ideology seems as important as Virginia self-interest.
George Mason hated the Virginia port restrictions. Mason likened the port bill to
putting a chain across the channel of Virginia’s finest rivers at just sufficient depth that
deep-water ships could not pass over it.120 To use a current analogy, the port bill was like
throwing a very large rock into the river at the bottom of each planter’s wharf.121 Mason
had been an ally of Madison’s on enforcement of the British debts and he argued that
giving foreign merchants speedy justice and honest payment of our debts would be “a
118
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more effectual means of inviting foreigners to trade with us” than the port monopoly.
Mason was not consistently laissez faire: he was in favor of high, protectionist imposts to
subsidize industry122 and grants and bounties to subsidize industry,123 but Mason was
right in being against port preferences.
Mason’s views prevailed in the Constitutional Convention. The Constitutional
text, as adopted, prohibits preferences “given by any Regulation of Commerce or
Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another.”124 Madison was sorry that port
preferences lost. The prohibition, he told Pendleton, was “dictated by the jealousy of
some particular States, and was inserted pretty late in the Session.”125 The Constitution
thus prohibited what had been a “centerpiece” or least a core concrete example of what
Madison had in mind in the Virginia legislature under regulation of commerce. While
giving port preferences was a purpose for the Constitutional movement in Virginia, it was
not a purpose that survived into the Constitutional document itself.
b. An American Navigation Act. The proponents of the Constitution objected to
the British excluding American ships from the British West Indies, under the British

122

George Mason, Debate in the Federal Convention (Aug. 28, 1787), in 2F ARRAND’S RECORDS 441

(arguing for allowing states to impose imposts with the consent of the Congress so as to protect local
manufacturing.)
123

George Mason (Sept. 13, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS 606 (Madison notes)(advocating association

to discourage foreign superfluities and to encourage American economy, frugality and manufactures.)
124

U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 9, cl. 6. See Mssrs. Caroll and Luther Martin (Aug. 25, 1787), in 2F ARRAND’S

RECORDS 417 (Madison Notes)(arguing that Congress might enact port preferences, requiring “vessels
belonging or bound to Baltimore, to enter and clear at Norfolk [Virginia].”)
125

Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Oct. 28, 1787), in 10 MADISON PAPERS 223.

48

Navigation Act, but they simultaneously wanted an American Navigation Act to exclude
British ships in American ports and to give American vessels a monopoly on carrying
American commodities. In the Massachusetts ratification convention, for example,
Thomas Russell argued all the great trading nations had benefited “from securing to
themselves the advantages of their carrying trade” and he argued that Congress should
confine American shipping to American vessels.126 Rhode Island was Anti-Federal,
stingy in giving revenue to the federal government, but it was also a shipping state and so
it had no trouble giving Congress the power to prohibit the importation of all foreign
goods in any but American Vessels.127 In North Carolina, Hugh Williamson argued that
regulation of commerce would allow the Government “to secure the carrying trade in the
hands of citizens in preference to strangers.”128 Governeur Morris of Pennsylvania
argued to the Philadelphia Convention that an American Navigation Act, requiring only
American vessels for American exports and imports, would encourage American ships
and American seamen, and that that would ultimately reduce costs of transporting
Southern produce and improve security.129
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Going back into the Revolutionary War period, the British Navigation Act
restrictions on trade had actually been quite popular in America, when American
suppliers were beneficiaries inside the monopoly restrictions.130 In 1774 as the War drew
nearer, the Continental Congress had denied that the British had the right to raise revenue
from the Colonies, without the consent of the Colonies, but the Congress had
simultaneously “cheerfully consented” that Parliament could secure the benefits of
regulating commerce for both the mother country and colonies, including by taxes that
channeled commerce.131 The Framers were, apparently, not against a Navigation Act in
principle, but only against being outside the protection and excluded from the West
Indies by the monopoly of the British Navigation Act.
In the Philadelphia Convention, George Mason opposed giving Congress the
power to enact commercial or navigation restrictions by simple majority vote. Mason
argued that with a Navigation Act, “a few rich merchants” in New York, Philadelphia and
Boston could monopolize shipping and reduce the value of southern crops by perhaps
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 215, 216 (saying that “[a] navigation Act or the Power to regulate Commerce in
the Hands of the National Government by which American Ships and Seamen may be fully employed is the
desirable weight that is thrown into the Northern Scale.”)
130
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one-half.132 The Southern states would be ruined, Mason would argue, because
commercial laws would enable “the Merchants of the Northern & Eastern States not only
to demand an exorbitant Freight, but to monopolize the Purchase of the Commodities at
their own Price.”133 The French Consul in Wilmington, North Carolina reported home
the view, fair to Mason’s viewpoint, that the new constitution was all to the advantage of
the northern shipping states because they could raise shipping prices.134 Bboth Edmund
Randolph and George Mason came out of the Convention citing the possibility of a
navigation act as a reason why they refused to sign the Constitution.135 Soon after the
Convention broke, Richard Henry Lee had complained that the “Commercial plunder of
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the South stimulates the rapacious Trader.”136 Opposition to “corporations and
monopolies,” more generally, was a recurring theme among Anti-Federalist opponents to
the Constitution.137
The demand for a two- thirds vote requirement for the regulation of commerce did
not succeed and the opposition to commercial monopolies did not prevent ratification,
but, on the other side of the coin, nothing much came of the suggestion for adoption of an
American Navigation Act either. The Constitution itself cut the heart out of the idea for
an American Navigation act by prohibiting Congress from imposing any tax on
exports.138 The prohibition on export tax meant that Congress could not give a
differential tax advantage to American ships in the carrying of Southern commodities.
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Congress would have had to take the far more radical step of banning foreign ships from
carrying U.S. exports entirely and Congress never seriously considered a complete
prohibition.
On the import side, where tax was allowed, Congress did discriminate some
against imports on foreign ships. The first tonnage fees imposed a tax of 6 cents per ton
on U.S.-owned ships, but 50 cents per ton on foreign-owned ships.139 In 1790, Congress
adopted a discriminatory 10% tax rate on imports coming in on foreign ships, while
allowing a base line tax at only 5% for imports coming in on United States ships.140 The
discrimination was gutted by the Jay Treaty of 1786 with Great Britain, however, which
obligated the United States and Great Britain to stop putting higher taxes on each other’s
ships,141 and it seems to have been ended generally in 1799 when general impost rates
were raised to 10%.142
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The discriminatory tonnage fees and the extra 5% tax on imports in foreign
owned ships from 1789-1799 are not nothing, but they are much less than what the
Federalists were calling for in advocating the Constitution. Without tax on exports, the
restriction on non-U.S. ships for American commodities had to be a total ban or nothing
and given the options, the country ultimately chose nothing as to the American
commodities. The call for monopoly turned out, after deliberation, not to have majority
support. Giving a monopoly to American-owned vessels probably would have induced
Britain and, indeed France as well, to reciprocate with exclusions of American ships from
their home ports and that would have been disastrous for American shipping that was
supposed to be the beneficiary of an American Navigation Act. Again, the argument
seems overwhelming that proposals that came to naught after deliberation by reason of
insufficient support, even once permitted, do not provide significant help in explaining
why we had the Constitutional revolution.
4. Miscellaneous Deep Water Shipping.
There are also nine other uses of “commerce” or “regulation of commerce” where
deep water shipping is the clear reference, but with a completely different kind of remedy
or with no remedy specified.143 A writer named “Philadelphiensis,” for instance, argued

cost (id.), presumably because they would have a far larger mark up than imports, e.g., from Europe, and
the statute was using cost as an estimate of value.
143
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that “if we mean to be a commercial people, we must endeavor to have a navy.”144
Edmund Randolph told Virginia that if the state failed to ratify the Constitution, then
France to collect its debt would seize ships and lay waste to Virginia’s shores, destroying
what little “commerce” Virginia had. 145 In two cites “commerce” is defined as what
“merchants” do,146 and “merchants” seems to refer to only the deep-water importers, and
(Jan. 10 1788), reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 338 (saying that “if we mean to be a commercial
people, we must endeavor to have a navy”); (4) Edmund Randolph, Speech to the Virginia Ratification
Convention (June 6, 1788), in 3E LLIOT’S DEBATES 74 (arguing that that if Virginia failed to join the
Constitution, then France to collect its debts could destroy what little commerce Virginia had, seizing ships
and laying waste to Virginia shores); (5) Alexander Hamilton, Debate in the New York Ratification
Convention (June 25, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 350 (saying that the objects of the federal government
include “the regulation of commerce, — that is, the whole system of foreign intercourse”); (6) James
Madison, Debate in Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 11, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 250 (saying
that if America can solve its present impotence, it could profit from carrying the commerce of nations at
war); (7) Letter from Comte de Moustier to Comte de Montmorin (June 25, 1788), in 18 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 190 (saying that New York Antifederalists do not want to involve themselves in commercial ties
with Europe, “which only furnish them with luxuries that they must do without to live in simplicity.”).
Cites (8) and (9) are found in infra note 146
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not to the country or retail storekeepers.147 When tax issues (35 cites), mercantilist
restrictions (68 cites) and miscellaneous (9 cites) are combined, deep-water shipping is
the reference in 112 or 82% of the cites. “Commerce” within the Constitutional debates
referred primarily to Atlantic Ocean shipping.
There is one odd-man-out quote, on land but at the border, referring to the border
fur trade. The French consulate wrote home in French saying that the Constitution would
induce the British to leave the frontier posts, in conformity with the Treaty of Paris, and
that would leave commerce in furs almost exclusively to the United States.148

The

reference might be to the trapping of furs, akin to manufacturing, or to trade with the
Indians. It seems also to reflect an especially French perspective given that French
North American empire had been active in fur trading. The reference, however, is surely
is not a reference to deep water shipping.

B. Fairness between States.
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Coastal shipping or other trade between the states shows up in only 23 or 17% of
the sampled quotes, and for many of those there is no remedy attached.149 A subset of 13
uses of “commerce” refers to trading between the states150 and a subset of 10 justifies
other enumerated restrictions on state abuses by calling them “commerce issues.”
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power in the existing Confederacy is the power to regulate the commerce between its several members); (9)
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1. Tolls on Interstate Commerce?
It has been said that creation of a common market allowing free trade within the
states was the purpose or at least a primary cause of the Constitution. In 1824, Justice
William Johnson argued that “[i]f there was any one object riding over every other in the
adoption of the constitution, it was to keep commercial intercourse among the states free
from all invidious and partial restraints.”151 To this day it is commonly echoed that the

NEWPORT HERALD (Feb. 7, 1788), reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 512 (complaining that
Virginia’s January 1788 impost imposed prohibitive rates on American goods and commodities); (10)
PUBLICOLA: ADDRESS TO THE FREEMEN OF NORTH CAROLINA, STATE GAZETTE OF NORTH CAROLINA (Mar.
27, 1788), reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 495 (saying that if North Carolina does not ratify, the
United States will treat us as foreigners, and will preclude us from all commerce with them and annihilate
our trade); (11) Edmund Randolph, Virginia Ratification Convention (June 6, 1788), in 9 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 985 (saying that the commercial regulations between us and Maryland have prevented reprisals
on each other); (12) PHOCION, UNITED STATES CHRONICLE (PROVIDENCE, R.I.) (July 17, 1788), reprinted
in 2 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 529 (saying that if we should join the new Confederacy, our former
inland commerce will be restored); (13) James Madison, “Preface To Debates in the Convention of 1787”
(circa 1830s), in 3F ARRAND’S RECORDS 548 (saying that Connecticut has taxed imports from
Massachusetts higher than imports from Great Britain and some states’ Navigation laws have “treated the
Citizens of other States as aliens.”)
151

Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (8 Wheat) 1, 231 (1824)(William Johnson, J. concurring). Justice Johnson

also described the regulation of commerce as the "immediate cause of the Constitution." Id., at 224. Many
of Justice Johnson’s cites are to arguments surrounding the Articles of Confederation, which included a
mandate that states not discriminate against out-of-state Americans. As noted in the text that follows,
Justice Johnson’s comments are not a fair description of the effect of the Constitution, but they are a fair
description of a movement for nationalization and against balkanization of the states, which includes the
adoption of the Articles.
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major purpose of the Constitution was to prevent protectionist economic policies among
the states and to establish a common market with free trade across state borders.152
Reducing barriers on inter-state trade, however, was not an important part of the
Constitutional debates. The major reason why not is that the goal had already been
mostly achieved and was not challenged. The Articles of Confederation had already
prohibited any state from imposing a “duty, imposition or restriction" on any out-of-state
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H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533, 535 (1949)(saying that a “chief occasion” of

the commerce clause was “the mutual jealousies and aggressions of the States, taking form in customs
barriers and other economic retaliation” and that the sole purpose for which Virginia initiated the
movement which ultimately produced the Constitution was to allow Congress to examine the trade of the
states and consider a uniform system of commercial regulation); C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of
Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1698 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting)(describing the dormant commerce clause
as patrolling an American "common market" premised on the economic interdependence of the states);
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980) (same); Hunt v. Washington State
Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977) (same); seee Patrick Garry, Commerce Power,
OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 167 (Kermit Hall, ed. 1992) (saying
that a “strong impetus for calling the Constitutional Convention of 1787 was the need for national controls
over the nation’s commerce which had become chaotic as many states had erected barriers to interstate
trade in an effect to protect business enterprise for its own citizens); Winkfield F. Twyman, Jr., Justice
Scalia and Facial Discrimination: Some Notes on Legal Reasoning, 18 VA. TAX REV. 103, 108 (1998)
(arguing that the Articles of Confederation had been unable to stem disruptive protectionism among the
several states, thus threatening the life of the infant republic); Jim Chen & Daniel J. Gifford, Law as
Industrial Policy: Economic Analysis of Law in a New Key, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 1315, 1323-24 (1995)
(describing the desire to break down interstate trade barriers as the impetus to political union created by the
Constitution)..
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citizens that it did not impose on its own inhabitants.153 The states seem to have followed
the norm well enough that the issue did not make it among the issues the debaters were
most concerned about. Protecting out-of-state individuals against abuse or discrimination
was an established and important norm in the debates, but the norm shows up almost
entirely in issues other than inter-state barriers. As one superb review of the evidence put
it, “the thing that strikes one’s attention in seeking reference to interstate commerce is
their paucity.”154
Consistently, when Madison recorded the Convention’s agreeing to the commerce
clause, without discussion or opposition, on August 16, 1787, he described the clause as
the “[c]lause for regulating commerce with foreign nation and &c.” Regulation of
commerce among the states shows up only within the “&c.”
In retrospect over 40 years later, moreover, Madison said that the "power to
regulate commerce among the several States" arose solely to prevent the commercial
deep-water-harbor states (e.g., New York) from abusing their power by taxing the noncommercial states (e.g., Connecticut and New Jersey). 155 Federalization of the impost is
not the only issue that shows up under inter-state commerce in the original debates, but
since none of the mercantilist restrictions were adopted, the impost is the only issue with
any continuing importance. If regulation of commerce is (mostly) synonymous with
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ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. IV (providing that the people of each State shall have free ingress

and regress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy therein “all the privileges of trade and commerce,
subject to the same duties, impositions, and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof respectively").
154

155

Abel, supra note 8, at 470.
Letter from James Madison to Joseph C. Cabell (Feb. 13, 1829), in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS 478.
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federalization of the state imposts, then there is no (significant) room in it for programs
addressing tolls or trade barriers between the states.
The Federalists did use the specter of trade barriers to scare voters toward
ratification of the Constitution. There are two cites in the sample arguing that if the
Constitution is not ratified, then duties will arise on interstate commerce: In Federalist
No. 22, Hamilton argued that if the Constitution were not ratified, the various states
would impose multiple duties on inter-state transportation, much as the separate German
states imposed tolls on the great rivers that flow through Germany.156 “Publicola”
speaking in North Carolina argued that if North Carolina did not ratify, then the other
states would “treat us as foreigners” and preclude commerce with them or impose
imposts that would annihilate our trade.157 Rhode Island ratified the Constitution in 1790
in large part in reaction to the very real threat of facing an impost or embargo on goods
going from Rhode Island to any of the states of the Union.158 The impetus of the
complaints, however, is not to the barriers under the Articles, but rather as a threat of
what might happen if the unity of the United States falls apart. Hamilton’s example of
156

THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 137 (Alexander Hamilton) (first published December 14, 1787).

157

PUBLICOLA: ADDRESS TO THE FREEMEN OF NORTH CAROLINA, STATE GAZETTE OF NORTH CAROLINA

(Mar. 27, 1788), reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 495.
158

Bruce Ackerman & Neal Kumar Katyal, Our Unconventional Founding, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 475, 538

(1995) (attributing Rhode Island’s ratification heavily to Senate passed bill that would prohibit Rhode
Island ships in American harbors and American ships in Rhode Island harbors); John Page (Va. Federalist
later Republican); John P. Kaminski, Rhode Island: Protecting State Interests, in RATIFYING THE
CONSTITUTION at 385 (Michael Allen Gillespie & Michael Lienesch, eds. 1989)(same); Speech to the
House of Representatives (May 26, 1790), in 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 1673 (opposing Senate passed bill
that would embargo all goods coming from Rhode Island).
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inter-state barriers came from the German empire, not here.159 Tolls on inter-state
commerce would require not just a failure to ratify the Constitution, under Hamilton’s
argument, but also a repeal of the Articles of Confederation prohibition on interstate
barriers, as well as an over-riding of the “genius of the American people.”
Consistent with the norm and with the mandate of the Articles, the state imposts
seem almost always to have exempted American source goods from tax.160 The New
York impost that was a major irritant to its neighbors exempted goods and merchandise
of the growth and manufacture of the United States.161 The Pennsylvania impost, which
also drained New Jersey, also had an exemption for goods of the “growth, produce or
manufacture of the United States or any of them.”162 The Massachusetts impost did the
same.163
There were violations of the norm. Before 1788, Virginia had had a 1% impost
on goods from “any port or place whatsoever.”164 Virginia also did not exempt vessels
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THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 137 (Alexander Hamilton) (first published December 14, 1787).
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FORREST MCDONALD, NOUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 18

(1985)(saying sister states were exempted from restrictions against foreigners); Kitch, supra note 42, at 1819 (saying the only example of a discriminatory state tax was New York’s attempt to prevent end runs
around its anti-British tax); William Frank Zarnow, New York Tariff Policies, 1775-1789, 37 New York
History: Proceedings of the New York Historical Association 40, 47 (1956)(New York exemptions).
161

1 Laws of the State of NY (1774-84), March 22, 1784, p. 599, ch x, II.
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Act of December 23, 1780, ch. 190, section 21, First Laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 427

(1984).
163

Act and Laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 1783, ch. 12, p. 17.
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11 HENNINGS STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA, ch. 38, §14 p. 70 (1781).
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from other states from its tonnage fees—the user fee’s for the harbor maintenance.165 In
1788, Virginia was shamed into adopting the usual exemption for American-source
goods, and it also raised the rate of tax to 3% at the same time.166 A Rhode Island
newspaper complained that Virginia’s impost imposed prohibitive rates on American
goods,167 although by the time of the report, Virginia had both tripled her impost from
1% to 3% and given all goods of American grown or manufacture an exemption. Prior to
the 1788 revision, the Virginia 1% tax is a violation of the normal rule that goods of
American growth or manufacturer should not bear state impost, and it seems to be the
most serious violation.
New York had tried to prevent end-runs around its impost on foreign imports by
imposing tax, at four times the normal rate, on foreign-source goods coming into New
York from Connecticut and New Jersey.168 The target is smuggled foreign imports,
however, and not goods grown or made in Connecticut or New Jersey. New York had
the normal exemption for American source goods. Since neither neighbor had a deepwater port, the tax at issue would have affected smugglers who unloaded the deep water
vessels offshore onto small boats. Given that it was only a 2-1/2% impost that was being
avoided, and that New York harbor was very convenient, the New York penalty tax (at
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11 HENNINGS STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA, ch. 8, §8 p. 121-122 (1781).
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12 HENNINGS STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA, ch. 1, §5 p. 416 (1788).
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NEWPORT HERALD (Feb. 7, 1788), reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 512 (complaining that

Virginia’s January 1788 impost imposed prohibitive rates on American goods and commodities.)
168

1 Laws of the State of NY (1774-84), March 22, 1784, p. 599, ch x, II. See Kitch, supra note 42, at 18-

19 for a description of the controversy.
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10%) on foreign goods coming in from its neighbors could not have been very important.
Most shippers would have used the New York docks and paid its fees.
Madison in the1830s said that he understood that Connecticut taxed imports from
Massachusetts higher than imports from Great Britain and that some states’ Navigation
laws have treated the Citizens of other states as aliens,169 but if so, there is no evidence
of it in the 1787 contemporaneous debates.
Still, all of the violations of nondiscrimination seem to be not very important
exceptions. The 1% Virginia pre-1788 impost seems to be as bad as they get. Even
today, moreover, state discrimination against out of state citizens remains a considerable
problem. State legislators are always looking for ways to protect the in-state citizens who
elect them and to tax or restrict the out-of-state citizens who do not.170 The preConstitution situation, thus, should not be judged from the norm of perfect
nondiscrimination. Albert Abel’s conclusion that there is a “paucity” of references to
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James Madison, “Preface To Debates in the Convention of 1787” (circa 1830s), in 3 FARRAND’S

RECORDS 547.
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For a review of the legal literature on restraining state discrimination against out-of-state citizens, see

LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §6-2, 1029-1043 (3d ed. 2000). Compare Richard
Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional Value, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 43 (1988)(defending the need of
the course to prevent discrimination and to protect economic union) with Luisa Heimzeling, The
Commercial Clause, 1995 SUP. CRT. REV. 217, 22 (expressing skepticism that the dormant commerce
clause serves efficiency, democracy or national union) and Kitch, supra note 42 (arguing that the states
bluff and posture and try to improve their position but in the long run free trade policies would inevitably
have triumphed by negotiation by the states and without the warping interference from the federal
government).
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interstate trade in the Constitutional debates he looked at holds true in this 168 cite
sample.
2. Fairness to Out-of -State Citizens Reflected Outside the Commerce Clause
Condemnation of a state’s discrimination against out-of-state citizens was
strongly felt at the time, but the norm shows up in the constitutional debates mostly on
issues besides the (phantom) tolls on inter-state commerce. The anti-discrimination norm
was commonly used to justify goals, accomplished in the text of the Constitution outside
of the commerce clause. The Constitution nationalized the state imposts, for example,
relying in part on the argument that the state imposts under the Confederation allowed the
states with good deep water harbors—and especially New York—to tax their
uncommercial neighbors.171 The Constitution, similarly, prohibited export taxes to
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THE FEDERALIST NO. 7, at 40 (Alexander Hamilton) (first published Nov. 17, 1787) (saying that some

states–e.g. New York–have the opportunity of rendering others-Connecticut and New Jersey–tributary to
them through commercial regulations by laying duties on importations); Letter from Timothy Pickering to
John Pickering (Dec. 29, 1787), in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 177 (attacking New York because it put
into her own treasury all the duties arising on the goods consumed in Connecticut, New Jersey, Vermont
and western Massachusetts); THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 283 (James Madison) (first published January 22,
1788) (saying that power to regulate commerce between the states was adopted to prevent commercial
states from collecting improper and unfair contributions from their noncommercial neighbors); Letter from
James Madison to J.C. Cabell (Feb. 13, 1829), in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS 478 (saying that power to
regulate commerce grew out of the abuse of the power by the importing States in taxing the non-importing,
and was intended as preventative provision against injustice among the States themselves); James Madison,
“Preface to Debates in the Convention of 1787” (circa 1830), in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS 542 (listing as
cause of the Constitution that some of the States had no convenient ports for foreign commerce, were
subject to be taxed by their neighbors, through whose ports, their commerce was carried on. “New Jersey,
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prevent the deep-water-harbor “commercial” states from taxing export goods produced in
neighboring “uncommercial” states.172 The Constitution prohibits “preference to the
ports of one state over those of another,”173 because such port preferences would affect
the States unevenly.174
Consistently, the Constitution’s adoption of protection for creditors’ rights was
justified in part in terms of justice across state lines. The Constitution, in article I, section
9, prohibits states from impairing contracts and from issuing paper money, and in the
Constitutional debates, those prohibitions were said to be necessary to prevent

placed between Philadelphia and New York, was likened to a Cask tapped at both ends.”); id., at 547
(saying that Rhode Island was well known to have been swayed by “an obdurate adherence to an advantage
which her position gave her of taxing her neighbors through their consumption of imported supplies.”)
172

Gouverneur Morris, Speech in the Federal Convention (Aug. 21,1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS 360

(Madison Notes)(arguing that without prohibition on state export taxes, deep-water harbor States will tax
the produce of their uncommercial neighbors); James Wilson, Speech to the Federal Convention (Aug. 16,
1787), in 2F ARRAND’S RECORDS 307 (Madison Notes)(opposing prohibition on tax on exports but
dwelling on the “injustice and impolicy of leaving N. Jersey Connecticut &c any longer subject to the
exactions of their commercial neighbours”); Roger Sherman, Speech at the Federal Convention (Aug. 16,
1787), in 2F ARRAND’S RECORDS 308 (Madison Notes)(supporting prohibition of tax on exports, but saying
that the oppression of the uncommercial States by commercial states was guarded against by the power to
regulate trade between the States.)
173
174

U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 9, cl. 6.
Charles Pinckney, Speech in the House of Representatives, 2 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, 16th Cong., 1st

Sess. 1318 (Feb. 14, 1820) (arguing that congressional power over inter-state commerce by water between
the states was given to prevent, among other things, port preferences).
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aggressions on the rights of other States” 175 and “injury to the citizens of other States.”176
Commerce in North Carolina, William Davie claimed, has been ruined by iniquitous laws
that discourage industry by legalizing “the payment of just debts by paper, which
represents nothing, or property of very trivial value.”177 Wicked Rhode Island had
attempted to require out-of-state creditors to accept Rhode Island dollars, worth twenty
cents on the dollar, as if they were worth face value.178 Paper money was a trick,
Governeur Morris explained, “by which Citizens of other States may be affected.”179
Other prohibitions on state debtor relief were similarly thought necessary as a
security to commerce against abuse by the states, stated Roger Sherman and Oliver
Ellsworth, in that the “interest of citizens of different states may be effected.”180
Merchants could trust their local correspondents in other states, James Wilson told
Pennsylvania, but they could not trust their property to the laws of the state in which their
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James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States (Apr. 1787), in 9 MADISON PAPERS

350.
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THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 301 (James Madison) (first published January 25, 1788) (arguing if states

were given the power to issue money “the intercourse among them would be impeded; retrospective
alterations in its value might be made, and thus the citizens of other States be injured; and animosities
kindled among the States themselves”).
177

William R. Davie, North Carolina Ratification Convention (July 24, 1788), in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 20.
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IRVING POLISHOOK, RHODE ISLAND AND THE UNION, 1774-1795, at 179 (1969).
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Gouverneur Morris (July 17, 1787), in 2F ARRAND’S RECORDS 26 (Madison Notes).
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Letter from Roger Sherman & Oliver Ellsworth to Governor Huntington (Sept. 26, 1787), in 3

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 352.
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correspondents live.181 Similarly, federal courts were given judicial power over suits
between citizens of different states, Madison told Virginia, to favor the commercial states
by allowing creditors to avoid state courts, where the creditor remedies might be
“imaginary and nominal.” 182
“Commerce” between or within the states was also used to justify other federal
powers enumerated the Constitution’s description of federal powers. In the Ratification
debates, for instance, The Federalist referred to the coining of money and to federal
bankruptcy law183 as “commerce” issues. Hamilton said that the Coinage and regulation
of weights and measures, allowed by clause 4 of Article I, section 8, were appropriate
federal powers, just as the King of England had such powers as the “arbiter of
commerce.”184 For the national powers allowed elsewhere, however, the commerce
clause is not carrying any extra weight.
The norm of justice among the states was also cited in failed attempts to defeat
provisions that the Constitution in fact adopted. The Constitution allows Congress to
181

James Wilson, Speech to the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention (Dec. 7, 1787), in 2E LLIOT’S

DEBATES 492.
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James Madison, Debate in the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 20 1788), in 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES

534, 535.
183

THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 287 (James Madison) (first published January 22, 1788) (saying that “[t]he

power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy [is properly federal because it] is so intimately connected
with the regulation of commerce, and will prevent so many frauds where the parties or their property may
lie or be removed into different States… .”)
184

THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 470 (Alexander Hamilton) (first published March 14, 1788) (saying that the

King of England in his capacity as “the arbiter of commerce” can establish markets and fairs, regulate
weights and measures, coin money, and authorize or prohibit the circulation of foreign coin).
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enact an American Navigation Act, giving United States vessels a monopoly on shipping
American commodities by simple majority vote of the Congress. Opponents wanted to
require a two-thirds vote for a Navigation Act so that a “few rich merchants” from New
York, Philadelphia and Boston could not “plunder the South.”185
Sometimes the norm against discrimination lead to over-reaction. The Framers
worried that “tonnage fees”—imposed on ships according to their weight to pay for the
upkeep of the harbor, wharves and lighthouses—might be used to discriminate against
out-of-staters. The Constitution prohibits states from imposing tonnage, in absence of
Congressional approval.186 Some discrimination makes sense because the tonnage rates
appropriate for vessels carrying full cargoes across the Atlantic that visited no more than
twice a year would be far too high for local or short-haul vessels that were in and out of
the harbor with half cargoes many times a week. The states, moreover, would be
expected to dredge the harbors, erect the light houses and keep up the piers and wharves
by state taxes alone and tonnage was a fine way to get the users to pay for the state’s
services.187 The prohibition on tonnage was thus probably an overreaction, driven by the
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George Mason, Speech before the Federal Convention (Sept. 15, 1787), in 2F ARRAND’S RECORDS

(Madison Notes). Cf. Letter from Richard Henry Lee to George Mason (Oct. 1, 1787), in 13
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 28 (“Whilst the Commercial plunder of the South stimulates the rapacious
Trader.”)
186

U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 10. See James Madison, Speech at the Federal Convention (Sept. 15, 1787), in

2 FARRAND’S RECORDS 625 (arguing that he was convinced that the regulation of Commerce was in its
nature indivisible and ought to be wholly under one authority).
187

See James McHenry, Notes of the Federal Convention (Sept. 4, 1787), in 2F ARRAND’S RECORDS 504

(McHenry notes)(saying that it “does not appear that the national legislature can erect light houses or clean
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strong norms of nondiscrimination and anger at the rogue states who could be expected to
misbehave if allowed to. In sum, the norm that states had to respect the rights of citizens
of other states was strong in the Constitutional debates, but in these illustrations, it shows
up as an argument for or against other provisions and not as an attack on any existing
interstate tolls or restrictions.
As the Constitution was developing, Madison himself seems to have considered
his mercantilist port- preferences project to be more important than the anti-discrimination
rule. When Virginia passed its port restrictions in 1784, it added an exemption for
Virginia-owned ships, which could dock anywhere they wanted. Madison confessed to
Monroe that applying the port restriction to out-of-state citizens, but not to Virginia
citizens, was a violation of the Articles of Confederation, an “erratum”, which “will no
doubt be rectified.”188 The comment is just cavalier enough about the violation of the
Articles to show that in Madison’s mind, the restrictive, port preference project was more
important than the anti-discrimination norm.
The Constitutional document, in fact, arguably does some harm to a barrier free
market because it failed to bring over the Articles’ express prohibition on discrimination.
The norm against trade barriers was strong through the period, and was not in contention,
but apparently the very lack of contention meant that the Constitutional drafters did not
repeat the Articles’ prohibition of discrimination. The Articles of Confederation,189 but
out or preserve the navigation of harbours”)(emphasis omitted). See also McHenry and Carrol (Sept. 15,
1787), in 2F ARRAND’S RECORDS 625 (Madison notes)(moving unsuccessfully that “no State shall be
restrained from laying duties of tonnage for the purpose of clearing harbours and erecting light-houses.”)
188

Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (Aug. 20, 1785), in 8 MADISON PAPERS 102.
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ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. IV.

70

not the Constitutional text, prohibit a states’ imposing a tax or restriction on an out-ofstate citizen it is unwilling to impose on its citizen. Arguably the omission did little
harm. The Courts have actively developed what is called the “dormant commerce
clause” to prevent discrimination directed toward out-of-staters.190 Some commentators
have, however, opposed application of an anti-discrimination norm, at least in its
strongest versions, on the ground that the Constitution did not include it in its text.191
Congress can act to regulate commerce between the states, because the specific words of
clause 3, the commerce clause, gives Congress the power, but the dormant commerce
clause, giving the judiciary the responsibility of enforcing nondiscrimination by the states
in absence of federal legislation, must rest on norms that were well expressed in the
Articles but not in the Constitution.192
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See reviews cited at supra note 170.

191

Justices Scalia and Thomas would be willing to roll back the dormant commerce clause to reach only

discriminations on the face of a state statute, in part because there is no authority for anti-discrimination in
the text. Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Jefferson Lines Inc, 115 S.Ct. 1131, 1246 (1995): CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69, 94-95 (1987). See also Lino Graglia, The Supreme Court and the American
Common Market, in REGULATION, FEDERALISM AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE 67, 70 (A. Dan Tarlock, ed.
1981)(arguing that in absence of text, policing discrimination against out of staters is a function the Court
should not perform); Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and
Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L. J. 569, 570-571 (accord, dormant commerce clause
without basis in text or structure).
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Mark Gergen, The Selfish State and The Market, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1117-1118 (1988) would find

the prohibition against discrimination in the Article IV, section 2 language that “Citizens of each State shall
be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens of the several States,” but the language needs to be
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C. Words without Controversies
There are also 21 quotes within the sample which are not attached to any remedy
or in which the reference is too vague to ascertain what is meant. These quotes are not
included in the 136 cites or 100%, used to determine what percentage any one advocated
program represents. Indeed the quotes without controversies are undercollected, since I
increasingly passed over quotes without a clear reference to a program as time went.
Nonetheless, this sample gives some indication of what is out there, outside of the
references to programs that I use as the baseline 100%.
Fifteen quotes in the sample, without any program attached, contrast “commerce”
with either “manufacturing” or “agriculture,” at least to the extent of listing commerce
separately.193 Some of the quotes show that the Founders worried about too much

stretched to reach corporations as well as individual citizens, to reach goods as well as citizens and to focus
on accomplishing an economic union, more than preserving individual “rights.”
193

(1) James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States (Apr. 1787), in 9M ADISON

PAPERS 351 (calling for new Constitution to fix defects of commercial affairs blocked by perverseness of
particular States, including law of naturalization and of copyright, incorporations for national purposes, the
providing of national universities and the building of “canals and other works of general utility”); (1)
PENNSYLVANIA MERCURY (June 28, 1787), reprinted in 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 210 (saying that
“agriculture, manufactures and commerce, shall impart their blessings, and enrich our country”); (2)
NORWICH PACKET (July 1, 1787), reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 167 (“Commerce must take the
lead, agriculture next follow, and manufactures should bring up the rear”); (3) PENNSYLVANIA GAZETTE
(Aug. 1, 1787), reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 182 (means of wealth are agriculture and
manufactures; wealth has no business with commerce, 'till she derives it from the products of the earth, or
from her own arts); (4) James Madison, Debate at the Federal Convention (Aug. 29, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S
RECORDS 452 (saying that Connecticut and New Jersey were “agricultural, not commercial States”); (5)
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Elbridge Gerry, Debate at the Federal Convention (Sept. 15, 1787), in 2F ARRAND’S RECORDS 635 (Rufus
King notes)(objecting to the Constitution because “the Power given respectg. Commerce will enable the
Legislature to create corporations and monopolies”); (6) Letter from Roger Sherman & Oliver Ellsworth to
Governor Huntington (Sept. 26, 1787), in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, 352 (arguing that state debtor relief
legislation was thought necessary as a security to commerce, in which the interest of foreigners as well as
the citizens of different states may be affected); (7) NOAH WEBSTER, AN EXAMINATION INTO THE
PRINCIPLES OF THE FEDERAL (Oct. 1787), reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 597 (saying that
landed property in England will never be sufficiently distributed, to give the powers of wholly into the
hands of the people, but that here commerce and manufacturing throw a vast weight of property into the
democratic scale); (8) THE FEDERALIST NO. 12, at 74 (Alexander Hamilton) (first published Nov. 27, 1787)
(referring to “rivalship” between agriculture and commerce); (9) “AN AMERICAN” (TENCH COXE), TO
RICHARD HENRY LEE, PHILADELPHIA INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER (Dec. 28, 1787), reprinted in 15
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 165, 169 (contrasting commerce and agriculture and arguing that even in
commercial states, agriculture predominates); (10) AN OLD MAN, CARLISLE GAZETTE (Jan. 2, 1788),
reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 228 (reporting toast to an increase of the agriculture,
manufactures and commerce of America); (11) CENTINEL VIII, PHILADELPHIA INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER
(Jan. 2, 1788), reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 233 (saying that “[e]very concern of individuals
will be sacrificed to the gratification of the men in power, who will institute injurious monopolies and
shackle commerce with every device of avarice”); (12) THE FEDERALIST NO. 35, at 219 (Alexander
Hamilton) (first published January 5, 1788) (saying that many mechanics and manufacturers are
immediately connected with commerce and that merchants are their natural friends); (13) RESOLUTIONS OF
THE TRADESMEN OF THE TOWN OF BOSTON,

MASSACHUSETTS GAZETTE (Jan. 8, 1788), reprinted in 15

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 292 (saying that if the proposed frame of government should be rejected, the
small remains of commerce yet left us, will be annihilated, the various trades and handicrafts dependent
thereon, must decay); (14) A COLUMBIAN PATRIOT: OBSERVATIONS ON THE CONSTITUTION, BOSTON (Feb.
1788), reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 278 (saying that “there are few who do not unite in the
general wish for the restoration of public faith, the revival of commerce, arts, agriculture, and industry,
under a lenient, peaceable and energetick government”); (15) Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, South
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commerce, as well as too little, which is consistent with mercantilism. Some, blessedly,
have no specific remedy in mind. Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, for instance, adopted a
physiocratic argument in South Carolina that there were only three ways for a nation to
acquire wealth – the first is by war, which is “robbery.” The second is in commerce,
“which is generally cheating.” The third is agriculture, which is “the only honest
way.”194 The theory of the Physiocrats that all other human activities were parasites upon
agriculture, would, of course, have been especially attractive to the planters.

The

natural supremacy of agriculture under physiocratic principles, however, did not seem to
have any program attached to it in America.
The usages of the word “commerce,” listed separately from “agriculture” or
“manufacturing,” do not seem to preclude more inclusive definitions of “commerce.”
“Regulation of commerce” is sometimes used to mean only nationalizing the state
imposts195 or used to justify other enumerated powers. Those usages, however, do not
seem to preclude other government programs that would be allowed under broader
Carolina Ratification Convention (May 14, 1788), in 2 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 581 (saying that
“there are but three ways for a nation to acquire wealth – the first is by war … which is robbery; the second
is in commerce, which is generally cheating; the third is agriculture, the only honest way”).
Justice Thomas has a sample of 12 cites in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 586 (1995) in
which agriculture or manufacturing are contrasted with “commerce,” only three of which seem to overlap
with this sample.
194

Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, South Carolina Ratification Convention (May 14, 1788), in 2 DEBATE

ON THE CONSTITUTION 581.
195

See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 7, at 40 (Alexander Hamilton) (first published Nov. 17, 1787) (saying

that some states—e.g. New York—have the opportunity of rendering others—Connecticut and New
Jersey—tributary to them by commercial regulations by laying duties on importations).
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definitions of “commerce.” “Regulation of commerce” was an omnibus term with a
cloud of specific and more general references. The more specific meanings do not seem
to exclude any others. Given how “utterly wrongheaded” the Physiograts were, 196 in
any event, it does seem quite lucky that physiogratic attitudes toward “commerce” are not
the only meaning embodied in the Constitution.
Words that do not have any programs attached to them also do not seem to carry
any water as a cause tending toward the adoption of the Constitution. Clause 3, for
instance, gives Congress the power to regulate commerce with Indian tribes, but there
were no controversies in trade with the Indians that show up in the sample. The
Constitution just repeated the power allowed to the Congress by the Articles of
Confederation, without treating the power as having any weight. 197 Regulation of trade

196

Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUMB. L. REV. 1, 8 (1999); see EDWIN R.A.

SELIGMAN, THE SHIFTING AND INCIDENCE OF TAXATION 125-142 (4th ed. 1921) (describing the physiocrats
and their influence). Voluntary trades add value to both sides, if they are voluntary, and manufacture adds
immense value to its raw materials, not all of which come from agriculture. Adam Smith’s critique,
concluding that agriculture is not the exclusive source of wealth, was devastating. There is something
awful about reading a distinction between agriculture and “nonproductive” activity as the Constitutional
distinction, even if planters liked it. This is supposed to be a durable Constitution, interpreted
sympathetically. Commerce, in any event, has other definitions in 1787 in which agriculture is not the key
distinction.
197

The Congressional trade with the Indians comes from the Articles of Confederation, which provided

that congress had the power to regulate “the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians, not members
of any of the States.” ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. IX. It was added to a draft of the commerce
clause, which provided that Congress could regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the states,
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with the Indians is not a substantial cause of the Constitution, even though the trade with
the Indians is included in the words. So similarly other usages of “commerce,” without
any program or remedy behind them can not have had substantial influence on the
adoption of the Constitution.
Finally, six references to “commerce” are so general as to not give a sufficient
clue about the controversy or even arena they are talking about.198 Some are important,
for example, George Washington’s cover letter for the Constitution citing the power to
regulate commerce as one of the reasons for ratification. The interpretation here is that
on September 4, 1787 by motion of the Committee of Eleven (chaired by Brearly) and adopted without
dissent. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS 493, 498 (Madison notes).
198

(1) Letter from [George Washington] the President of the Federal Convention to the President of

Congress (Sept. 17, 1787), in FORMATION OF THE UNION (saying that desire is for general government to
have the power to make war, peace, and treaties, levy money and regulate commerce); (2) Alexander
Hamilton’s Conjectures About the New Constitution (Sept. 1787), in 1 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 9
(saying the Constitution probably would be ratified because “the good will of the commercial interest
throughout the states which will give all its efforts to the establishment of a government capable of
regulating protecting and extending the commerce of the Union.”); (3) THE FEDERALIST NO. 11, at 72
(Alexander Hamilton) (first published November 24, 1787) (saying that “[an] unity of commercial, as well
as political interests, can only result from an unity of government”); (4) CENTINEL VI, PENNSYLVANIA
PACKET (Dec. 25, 1787), reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 99 (opposing the Constitution by
saying that people are so impatient to “reap the golden harvest of regulated commerce, that they will not
take time to secure their liberty and happiness”); (5) Governor Edmund Randolph’s Reasons for not
Signing the Constitution, Richmond, Virginia (Dec. 27, 1787), in 1D EBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 601
(saying that the members of that Convention thought unanimously, that the control of commerce should be
given to Congress); (6) THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 314 (James Madison) (first published January 26, 1788)
(saying that the regulation of commerce is a new power, but one that few oppose).
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these references are trying to talk about all cases fitting under “regulation of commerce”
and that they are therefore proxies for the full universe of “commerce,” the content and
mix of which are determined by the other cites in the sampling. These six too-general
references are not part of the total sample used to calculate percentages for the other
categories.
D. How Important was Commerce as a Cause?
The programs the advocates contemplated within the commerce clause were in
total very modest. The retaliatory impost against the British and the monopoly for
American vessels for American commodities were touted by the Federalists, but they
were never enacted, once the Constitution was adopted, even in the overwhelmingly
Federalist Congress that could do as it wished on the issue. As it turned out, even
proponents of the Constitution did not really want to provoke the ire of the British and
risk loss of access to the British ports, once they thought seriously about it. Port
preferences were even more starkly rejected, within the Convention itself. “Regulation
of commerce” was also a code word to justify replacing the 2-1/2% New York state
impost with a 5% federal impost, but that replacement was needed to pay Revolutionary
War debts and restore the public credit, and it should be understood therefore as a tax and
war debt issue, adequately covered by the tax powers clause. There is no purely
commerce clause program that had any legs.
Given the modest original size of the commerce clause, it is ironic that the
commerce clause has come to be viewed as the general jurisdictional boundary of the
federal government. The commerce clause seems in strict historical context no more
important than the next clause, clause 4, which authorized Congress to make a national
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bankruptcy law. The bankruptcy power remained, a “mere dead letter,” as Story’s
199

Commentaries put it in 1833.

200

A national bankruptcy act was not passed until 1898,

considerably too late for the bankruptcy to be a live cause of the Constitution. Given the
110 year delay, the bankruptcy clause can not be called a significant cause of the
Constitution, although it is listed in section 8. The same is true for the commerce clause.
Arguably recognizably modest clauses, like punishing counterfeiting (clause 6) and
establishing post roads and post offices (clause 7) are more meaningful historical causes.
Given its modest original size, the modern importance of the commerce clause
comes, much like a panda’s thumb, because of evolutionary growth. A panda’s thumb is
apparently not a thumb at all, but is rather an evolutionary development from a once-tiny
wrist bone, which evolved over time into a sharp tool to strip bamboo.201 Its humble
roots do not mean that it is illegitimate. Pandas, for example, do need their bamboostripping “thumbs” for survival. So similarly, the growth of the commerce clause was
driven by “the necessities of the Union”202 and the demand for a federal government able
to serve a national economy. Evolution for survival is not an illegitimate process.

199

JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 3:§§ 1105 (1833), reprinted in 2 THE

FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 639, 641.
200

See, e.g., Rhett Frimet, The Birth of Bankruptcy in the United States, 96 COM. L.J. 160 (1991)

(describing the history of American bankruptcy legislation and proposals through the Bankruptcy Act of
1898.)
201

STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE PANDA'S THUMB: MORE REFLECTIONS IN NATURAL HISTORY (1980).

202

Edmund Randolph, Draft of the Constitution for the Committee of Detail, Federal Convention, July-

August 1787, 2 Farrand 142.

78

Still, the modesty of the commerce power makes it difficult to lean on it to
explain the Constitutional Revolution. The Constitution replaced the sovereignty of the
states with the sovereignty of the people, and created a new government in the federal
level supreme over the states. Clause 1, the first power listed, gives the Federal
government the power to tax to provide for the common defense and general welfare.
The tax power gave effect and consequence to the federal government. The explanation
for the Constitutional Revolution thus plausibly resides in clause 1, tax to provide for
common defense and general welfare, rather than in clause 3, the commerce clause. The
power to adopt programs that the country did not in fact want and Constitutional
language with no significant programs or grievances attached to it gives no meaningful
help in explaining why the Founders created the Constitutional revolution. The important
causes of the Constitution have to be lie elsewhere.
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